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PERU: ｐｏｔｅｾｾｉａｌ＠ ｄｅｍｊｬ｜ｾ＠ FOR CASSAVA 
ｾｾ｣ｲｯ･｣ｯｮｯｭｩ｣＠ Policy and Agriculture 
The economic policy context 
During the past 35 years the Peruvian economy has stagnated. Real 
per capita GDP grew at less than 1% per year, one of the lowest rates of 
growth in the world. 
In the past twenty years, the policies have been characterized by 
industrial protection within an import-substitution environment, with 
high government intervention accompanied by a chronically overvalued 
exchange rate, fiscal deficits, high inflation, rapid rural-urban 
migration, a heavy per capita foreign debt burden, and a long run of 
declining growth. These manifestations are all the result of the policy 
environment as well as of outside factors such as unstable terms of 
trade and variable climatic conditions. Careful analysis of economic 
performance ｾ･｡､ｳ＠ to the conclusion that the unstable and slow growth 
should be attributed primarily to man-made policies (Nogues). 
Socioeconomic policies can be divided in four periods: before 1968, 
between 1968 and 1979 (under military rule), between 1979 and 1985 
(under the Acción Popular Democratic Government), and after 1985 (under 
the APRA Government). 
\{hile total real GDP grew over the period 1950-85 at an annual 
3 . 5%, that of agriculture s tagnated at 2.0%, well below the 2 .7% annual 
growth of the population. In 1950-68, real GDP· grew at a sound 5.3% per 
year to slow down in 1969-74 to 4.3% per year . The country entered a 
deep recession in 1975. Real per capita GDP decreased at an annual 1.9% 
in 1975-85, while per capita agricultura! GDP decreased at an annual 
1.0% in that same period (Table 1) . The worst year was 1983 when, due 
to climatic adversity, real per capita GDP decreased by 9.4% and 
agricultura! GDP contracted by 7.6% (Table 2). Annual inflation went 
from around 30% in 1975 to 163% in 1985. 
The policy environment 
Until 1968, policies were characterized by moderate industrial 
protection, reduced state interventionism, and relatively liberal market 
policics . In 1968 the country's political administration changed 
sharply to a military government that designed a set of policies 
oriented to transform the structure of property-holding, reduce foreign 
dependence, and achieve sustained growth in an environment of improved 
social justice (Alvarez R., Apuntes 16). Consequently, Peru went f r om 
having one of the lowest shares of state participation in total 
investment to a vast public bureaucracy such as Petro Peru, Pescaperu, 
Minero Peru , Centromin Peru , Electroperu, sugar coops, EPSA, and ENCI 
(Lowenthal, A. F., Apuntes, p. 27) . Government participation in 
investments went, particularly in banking and mining, from 13% in 1968 
to 23% in 1975 . 
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Table l . Total and agricultural GDP (in millions of Sols), 1973, Peru . 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
a Annual growth rates 
Period 
1970-75 
1975-80 
1980- 85 
1970-80 
1970-85 
Real 
GDP 
352,596 
370,336 
376 , 501 
392,559 
421 , 933 
44 1, 073 
449 , 987 
449,738 
447,470 
465,939 
483 , 840 
503, 66 3 
504,401 
444 , 040 
464,910 
471,884 
Agricultural growth rates 
1950-55 
1961 - 65 
1971- 75 
1981- 85 
GDP 
4.4% 
1. 6% 
-1. 4% 
3. 1 i. 
l. 9% 
S ha re of 
GDP 
22% 
15% 
ＱＳ ｩｾ＠
12% 
a. Rates of growth calculated by author. 
SOURCE : Cuent a s Nacionales del Perú, I NE. 
Agricultural 
GDP 
51 ,701 
52,759 
51,490 
51 , 687 
53 ,582 
53 , 564 
54,372 
54,302 
53 ,478 
55 ,575 
52 , 575 
58 , 643 
40 , 330 
55,207 
62 , 329 
63 ,638 
Agríe. 
GDP 
0 . 6% 
- 0.1% 
3.0% 
0 . 5% 
0.6% 
in 
Share of 
Agriculture 
in GDP 
(%) 
14.7 
14. 2 
13 . 7 
13. 2 
12. 7 
12. 1 
12. 1 
12 . 1 
12.0 
11.9 
10. 9 
11.6 
8.0 
12.4 
13.4 
13.5 
labor force 
55% 
50% 
48% 
38% 
Table 2. Statistical profile, Peru . 
Area (km2) 
Population: total 1985 (67.3% urban) 
Annual growth rate 1970- 85 
Birth r ate (1984) 
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Mortality per 1000 inhabitants (1984) 
Infant mortality per 1000 l ive births (1984) 
Life expectancy at birth (1984) 
Percentage of literacy (1984) 
Labor force by sector (1980) 
Agriculture 
Hining 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Others 
Real production 
Total GDP (market prices) 
ａｾｲｩ｣ｵｬｴｵｲ｡ｬ＠ sector 
M ning sector 
ｾｾ ｮｵｦ｡｣ｴｵｲｩｮｧ＠ sector 
Construction sector 
Central government 
Current revenues 
Current expenditures 
Current savings 
Cabital expenditures 
eficit or surplus 
Domestic financing 
Honey, prices, and salaries 
Domestic credit 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Money supply (M1) 
Consumer prices (annual average) 
Real wages 
Exchange r a te 
Official rate (Peruvian Sol to u.s . 
Real effective exchange rate (Index 1980 = lOO) 
Terms of trade (Index 1980 = 100) 
Balance of payment s 
Current account balance 
Merchandise balance 
Merchandise exports ｾｆｏｂｾ＠Merchandise imports FOB 
Net services 
Transfers 
Capital account (ne t ) 
Change in net reserves (- increase) 
Externa! public debt 
Disbursed debt 
Debt servi ce actually paid 
.Interest payments / expor t of 
goods and NFS 
do llar) 
1981 
3 . 1 
9.9 
-4. 8 
-0.1 
11.0 
17.9 
17.7 
0. 2 
5.2 
- 4 . 9 
3 . 4 
100 . 0 
111. 8 
46. 2 
75.4 
-1. 7 
0.42 
86. 4 
82.9 
-1, 725 
- 555 
3 , 249 
3,804 
-1,337 
167 
485 
654 
6,009 
1,91 5 
13.1 
1 ,280,219 
19,696,000 
2. 6% 
36 . 4 
10 . 3 
94.9 
59 . 6 
84.2 
(Percentages) 
40.0 
1. 2 
14 . 5 
4 . 4 
39.9 
1982 1983 1984 
(Growth rates) 
0 . 9 -12.0 4.7 
3.0 -10.2 12. 9 
8 .3 -7.4 6 . 4 
- 2.7 -17.3 2.8 
2 . 3 -21.5 1.5 
(Percentages o f GDP) 
17.5 14. 2 16.2 
17.3 19. 2 17.3 
0 . 2 - 5. 0 -1.1 
4.2 3.9 4.0 
- 3 . 9 - 8.9 - 5.0 
0.9 3.4 1.5 
(Growth rates) 
23.2 146.6 -73. 3 
95 .8 102.0 127.9 
36 .9 91.7 128. 0 
64 . 5 111.1 110. 2 
2.2 - 16.7 -15 . 3 
(Annual average) 
0 . 70 1.63 3 . 47 
85 . 8 92.8 94 . 7 
72.3 71.3 72.2 
(Millions of dollars) 
-1,513 - 872 - 252 
-402 295 1,008 
3,106 3,019 3 ,1 49 
3,508 2 , 724 2 ,1 41 
- 1, 268 - 1 ,387 -1, 419 
157 219 159 
942 1,213 1 '061 
163 89 - 250 
(Millions of dollars) 
6 , 934 
1, 526 
8 , 702 
781 
9 , 824 
609 
Ｈｐ･ｲ｣･ｮｴ｡ｾ･ｳ Ｉ＠
14.3 10. 7 .5 
SOURCE: IDB. 1986. Economic and Soci al Progress i n Latin America. 
1985 
1.5 
2.1 
5.2 
3 . 4 
- 13 . 2 
17.4 
17. 1 
0 . 3 
3 . 3 
- 2.9 
- 0 . 1 
- 210 . 0 
102.0 
235 . 2 
163 .4 
-15.7 
10.98 
105.9 
70.0 
66 
1,097 
2 , 967 
1,869 
- 1 ,158 
127 
601 
237 
10,510 
617 
9 . 4 
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Severe distortions in factor and product market rose amidst a 
prolonged period of slow and unst able growth with accelerating inflation 
and failure by t he administration to keep the economy in macroeconomic 
balance. Among the most significant distortions were (Nogues; Alvarez): 
Increasing importance of state- owned enterprises and 
nationalization of foreign firms. 
Ambitious land reform processes that eliminated the most productive 
land markets. 
Highly negative real interes t rate ceilings. 
High wage taxat ion and labor market segmentation coming from a 
strictly enforced labor tenure system. Workers were entitled to 
tenure after they have been in the job for 3 years. 
Important fiscal incentives for investment that led to the adoption 
of very capital intensive technologies. 
Significant barriers to foreign direct investment. 
Export and import restrictions and state trading, together with 
foreign exchange controls and periodic overvalued domestic currency, 
within an import- substitution strategy . 
The result of the policy- induced distortions and state 
interventions was to transform Peru, by the late seventies, from a 
social sxstem characterized by liberal principles and policies during 
the fifties, to a very tightly controlled and distorted economy. 
"Distortions and controls eliminated not only foreign competition, but 
also domestic ｣ｯｾｰ･ｴｩｴｩｶ･＠ forces . The consequences have been disastrous. 
Income distribution objectives have apparently failed to be met. Also, 
during the sixties and seventies, while the world economy was booming, 
Peru lost a clear opportunity to continue the growth ímpetus that it 
showed during the fifties". (Nogues, Trade liberalization: sorne lessons 
from Peru's experience). 
The country entered a new phase of economic activity with the arrival 
of a democratic governme.1t in 1978. A stabilization program was 
immediately drawn. The fiscal deficit was reduced, an i mportant real 
devaluation took place which led to significant improvements in the trade 
and current account balances as well as to major increases in forei gn 
exchange reserves which went from negative US$-1.025 in 1978 to positive 
US$1.276 in 1980 . However, the stabilization plan lef t most of the 
policy-induced distortions mentioned earlier unchanged . 
In 1980 , the government implemented a trade liberalization 
approach. Up to that moment the trade regime was characterized by 
across-the-board import-licensing procedures where all foreign goods 
similar to those domestically produced could not be imported. By 
September of 1980 the government substituted the import prohibitions by 
added-va lue t ariffs characterized by a maximum tariff of 60% and reduced 
export ·taxation considerab l y (J. Nogues). It is important to s tress the 
fact that the liberalization effort did not have a substantial impact on 
agriculture. For basic foo ds tuffs , the government maintained a monopoly 
to import and commercialize them. 
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The system of mini-devaluation followed by a maxi-devaluation was 
adopted and fiscal measures were ímplemented (higher taxes and príces, 
l ower expenditures). Strict money supply goals were formulated with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and closely followed and monitored. 
The experiment of liberalization was short lived. The economy had a 
sluggish performance characterized by fiscal deficits, recession, and 
ínflation due in part to unusually strong weather adversities in 1983 
related to the El Niño ocean strean when real GDP decreased by 12. 0% 
(Table 2). Acute current account deficits were compensated by ínflows 
coming from foreign loans. 
Halfway through 1985 the government changed hands from a conservative, 
market-oriented leadership to a left-leaning group dedicated to market and 
price control, with agriculture very high on its list of priorities. 
An emergency plan was designed to reactivate t he economy of the 
country and improve expectations. The following measur es were adopted: 
Elimination of the IMF standby agreement. 
Devaluation by 12% and freezing of exchange rate. 
Control of fiscal expenditures in current rather than investment 
items. 
Restrictions on imports, reversing the liberalization trend of the 
previous government. 
Increasing the mínimum wage by 50%, medium-level salaries by 
30% , and freezing top-level salaries . 
Reduction of cost of other inputs to compensate for higher labor 
costs, especially interest rates. Agricultural loan rates went 
from 180% in J uly to 39% in October 1985. Later, a differentiated 
regional structure was developed, favoring f irst the mountain areas 
(Sierra), then the jungles (Selva) , and finally the coastal areas 
(20%, 3S%, and SS%, respectively) . 
Price controls. In particular, food prices were frozen and, for 
perishable commodities, a board formed by government 
representatives (Ministries of Economics and of Agriculture) , 
intermediaries , and producers met every other week to determine 
wholesale and retail prices. 
A maximum of 10% of export revenues destined for servicing 
foreign debt requirements. By 1986, debt ser vice (principal and 
interests) was similar in size to total export revenues (about 
US$3.S billion but debt service was held at US$3SO million). 
In s ummary , the policies of industrialization by import s ubstitution 
that characterized the Peruvian economy since the sixties, led to a s teady 
decrease of the real exchange rate until 1977 , when it recovered 
slightly in 1978 and 1979, coinciding with the trade liberalization 
strategy, and fell again during the eighties. 
Declines in the real exchange rate have harmed the agricultural 
sect or , especially in the production of agricultural t radeables , and 
have led to increased domestic consumption of those items (imported 
cereals and exportables) , reduced t he contribution of agriculture to 
growth and to the balance of payments, and made t he country more 
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dependent on imported food (Valdes and Alvarez; Nogues). An a ggressive 
governmental presence in the sector contributed to the blocking of 
competitive forces without and within the sector . Important imbalances, 
rather than being r esolved, were perpetuated. 
Agricultural Policies 
The analysis of Peruvian agriculture must begin with a sharp 
differentiation of performance in agricultural production between 
geographical regions: Coastal, Selva, and sierra. The lack of a 
determined effort to achieve a balanced regional growth is evident: the 
three highly differ entiated regions communicate poorly among themselves. 
The coastal region, dominated by the high pressure system of the 
Pacific, is extremely dry . Coastal farmers are the richest and possess 
middle-sized farms which operate under relatively modern conditions and 
are totally dependent on irrigation. They supply the bulk of 
agricultural products. The majority (over 55%) of the country's 
population live in this region. Access to the other two regions is 
expensive . 
The Sierra is characterized by small farmers who have limited 
resources, were untouched by the agrarian reform, and whose 
contributions to the coastal markets have been declining, except for ' 
beef and dairy pr oducts. 
The Selva is a new frontier with a dynamic agricultural sector, but 
separated, almost isolated, from the main markets by the Andes . The 
local population (over 3 . 5 million) is self-sufficient and is growing 
surpluses of maize and rice (two of the crops with the highest direct 
government intervention) and important coca plantations. However, the 
infrastructure is inadequate, especially the roads leading to the coast. 
Transport from the Selva to Lima is not only expensive (at US$100 per 
ton), but also unreliable dueto frequent landslides and other 
disruptions to traffic flow. This is particularly constraining to 
the commercialization of perishable commodities such as roots, tubers , 
and vegetables and constitute a major obstacle to development . 
The agricultural share in GDP dropped from 24% in the fifties to 
12% in the eighties (Table 1). This is particularly disturbing, 
particularly as the country ' s overall economic performance during that 
period was dismal. Industrial protectionism has been implemented at the 
expense of agriculture, a bias that has been aggravated by specific 
policy actions within the sector such as the ambitious agrarian reform 
of the seventies, severe distortions in factor and product markets, and 
widespread government intervention that reduced or eliminated 
competitive forces in practically all markets. 
Regional imbalances, together with an agricultural policy that has 
had a clear urban bias, led Peru to become increasingly dependent on 
food imports . It is much easier to reach Lima and other coastal towns 
by sea than f rom the Selva or the Sierra. 
7 
Specific agricultura! policies 
Sorne agricultura! policies are part of the general macroeconomic 
goals of the government while others appear like isolated policies to 
compensate for the negative effects of the general policies, for 
example, the agrarian reform is a general policy while subsidized credit 
is a specific policy. The policies can be grouped into 
input-and-product policies, commercialization, credit, and research and 
extension. 
Price and trade policies implemented after 1968. Producer prices for 
internationally traded crop commodities, that is, wheat, maize, rice, 
cotton, and sugar, with t he occasional exception of maize, have been 
kept at prevailing real exchange rates. (Orden et al.; Univ. Mino.) . 
This, in conjunction with trade policies adverse to agriculture and to 
an overvalued exchange rate, have added up to a severe policy 
discrimination against the agricultura! sector in the past two decades. 
Consumer prices, on the other hand, have been kept artificially 
low. The main beneficiaries have been wheat, rice, sugar, dairy 
products, oils, and imported maize. In 1969, the annual food subsidy of 
the central government represented approximately US$100 million in real 
1973 prices. In 1983 this figure was approximately US$200 million , 
equivalent to 20% of the fiscal deficit (Franklin et al., 1983). Rice 
received 53% and imported wheat received 32% of the food subsidy budget. 
It was estimated that in 1980, the food subsidy amounted to 2.7% of 
total consumer expenditures and 1.8% of GDP. According to a recent 
study (Franklin et al.), the impact of these food subsidies may have 
been somewhat regressive. Such subsidies discriminate strongly against 
roots and tubers. 
Commercialization of rice was, and still is, performed by ECASA 
(Empresa Comercializadora de Arroz S. A., the state rice trading 
agency), while wheat (over 90% is imported), was, and is, handled by 
ENCI (another state agency). ENCI also trades with cotton, selling to 
local mills at prices below the price received for export sales. 
Producer prices were kept generally low (Valdes and Alvarez) . The 
active role of the state in the commercialization of certain crops such 
as maize, cotton, rice, and wheat, and visible distortions in the prices 
of such inputs as land, water, transportation , fertilizer, credit, and 
machinery (also pushing them to levels lower than their costs to the 
economy), inefficiently dictated resource allocation among intervened 
products and also away from those crops excluded f r om government favors . 
Transportation subsidies have encouraged sorne movement of resources 
from the coast to other regions, but at an insufficient level. The 
State absorbs mos t of the cost of transportation subsidies by 
standardizing producer and consumer prices for each crop throughout the 
country. However , the prívate sector cannot compete with the State in 
those crops where the system operates and, as a result, existing 
inefficiencies are often perpetuated. 
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As a result of the implemented agricultural policies the production 
of cassava and potatoes decreased at annual rates of about 7 .5% and 6 . 0% 
in 1966-83 , while imports of wheat grew at a 3.0% per year and those of 
coarse grains, that is, maize and sorghurn grew at 3 . 7% in the same 
period. Among the five carbohydrate products considered in this study , 
only rice showed an increase in production over t he period--at around 
3.7% per year. In this particular case, new varieties and improved 
cultivation technologies, together with government subsidies and 
commercialization, played a majar role in the relative success of the 
crop. 
The agrarian reform of Velasco, based on compulsory establishment of 
farmers associations without providing advice or credit to their leaders, 
caused a deterioration in the performance of those institutions (Paz) . 
Table 3 shows that expansion of production areas did not contribute to 
expanded agricultural output in 1970-80. 
The liberalization of import s and of domestic and external 
marketing in 1979-85 gave the prívate sector a chance to obtain their 
own inputs directly. However, state trading agencies kept a high degree 
of intervention through the retention of important price distortions 
that are still present in the economy . Staples were subjected to price 
control, that is, unhulled rice, yellow and white sugar, domestically 
produced oilseeds, cotton as seeds and meal, hard yellow maize and grain 
sorghum, wheat and wheat flour, and butter and milk in several fo rms 
(Paz; CGIAR Study Paper 12) . The liberalization of the economy, 
although short lived, had a positive impact on agriculture, whose GDP , 
recuperated at an annual 3 . 0% in 1980-85 as compared with the - 0.1% of 
1975-80 (Table 1) . 
Another democratic government carne to office in mid-1985 . Almost 
absolute control of the food-producing sector was reimposed. ENCI 
assumed exclusivity in imports of wheat, maize, sorghum, oilseeds, and 
dairy products. Tariffs were revised for those products and an 
administered pricing system for food products was designed for both 
producer and consumer levels. 
The majar feature of the new government is the emphasis placed on 
agriculture and the effort to promete development of the traditionally 
neglected regions of the country: the "South trapezoid" of the Sierra, and 
the Selva . Important input and output price incentives were created to 
this end and credit rates and availability were designed to 
differentiate in favor of those regions. However, unless majar 
infrastructure improvements are undertaken, particularly in the case of 
roads. these policies cannot be taken as s erious and permanent endeavors 
to achieve a more balanced agricultural growth and to increase food 
production to above population growth rates . 
I n the l ong run, agricultural production in the Sierra and the 
Selva should be justified by their own efficiency (including lower 
transportation costs) rather than by the subsidies of monopolistic s tate 
trading agencies . These monopolies have narrowed the production base to 
a few protected grains , and have not allowed crops with obvious 
agronomic advant ages such as potatoes and cassava to enter , at a 
significant level, the Peruvian diet . 
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Tab le 3. Average annual growth rates of agricultura! 
output, total inputs (including 
Output 
sources of 
1950-60 
Output 
traditional inputs), and residual, by 
decade, 1950-80 , Peru. 
and 
growth 
Total inputs 
Land 
Labor 
Capital 
Residual 
1960-70 
Output 
Total input s 
Land 
Labor 
Capital 
Res idual 
1970-80 
Output 
Total inputs 
Land 
Labor 
Capital 
Residual 
1950-80 
Output 
Total inputs 
Land 
Labor 
Capital 
Residual 
% 
2.00 
0 . 96 
0 . 22 
0 . 61 
0.13 
1.04 
3 . 20 
1.07 
0.11 
0 . 93 
0.03 
2 .13 
0.90 
1.49 
0 . 00 
0 . 56 
0.93 
- 0 . 59 
2 . 00 
1.18 
0 . 11 
0 . 70 
0 . 37 
0 . 82 
SOURCE: Elias, V. 1985 . IFPRI report, No. 50, Oct . 
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Agricultura! credit. The abrupt changes in the direction of policies 
were reflected in the operation of the financia! system as well. State 
intervention in this sector was high. This meant that commercial 
banking was rapidly displaced from agriculture. In 1950, 65.1% of 
agricultura! loans carne from commercial banks which lend mostly to 
cotton and rice in the coast (Table 4). By 1980, this percentage was 
clown to 5 . 7% (from 12.3% in 1950) and represented only 1 . 9% of their 
credit portfolio (Peru, el Agro en Cifras) . However, the Agrarian Bank 
(BAP), known earlier as the Agricultura! Development Bank, accounted for 
34.9% of these loans in 1950 while by 1980 its share had gone up to 
94.7%. 
In real terms, total agricultura! credit grew fast in 1950- 68, only 
to stagnate afterwards, coinciding with the slowdown of agriculture 
(Table 5) . 
Composition of credit by crops of destination changed abruptly, with 
cotton receiving over 50% of agricultura! loans in the late sixties but 
participating with only 18.3% in 1983. The contrary occurred to rice, 
which participation increased f r om about 15% in the late s·ixties to 46% 
in 1983 with important gains in areas financed (Tables 6 and 7) . 
Interest rates were kept consistently below inflation rates, especially 
after 1975 (Table 8), constituting an added element of discrimination 
against crops not so favored by this subsidy such as cassava . 
Research and extension. Government expenditures in agriculture are 
low in comparison to other countries in Latin America in terms of 
expenditure · per person employed in the sector but they are about average 
when analyzed in terms of expenditures per area harvested (Elias) . 
These outlays grew fast in the sixties and seventies, particularly for 
irrigation and agrarian reform. The National Farm Research, Extension 
and Education System was given a high priority in the sixties, but in 
the seventies the government assigned priority to the agrarian reform. 
Its research activities concentrated on the requirements of the coastal 
region, covering sugarcane, cotton, rice, maize, beans, potatoes , and 
sweet potatoes. The private sector had strong research programs on 
sugarcane and cotton in the sixties , when Peru had among the highest 
yields worldwide. 
The Agricultura! Promotion and Research Institution (INIPA) was 
created in 1981 . Five national priority programs were established: 
potatoes, maize, rice, grain cereals (wheat, barley, and oats), and 
grain legumes (Paz). The National Livestock Program was created in 
1985. The most successful of these programs has been rice, for which 
severa! new varieties have been introduced, helping to significantly 
increase yields and production in the Selva, but having no significant 
effect on productivity in coastal areas. Yields of crops under the 
other programs have not shown significant improvements over the past t wo 
decades (Paz) . 
Tabl.e 4. Evolution in real tenns of agricultura! credit (in millions of 1970 Sols) granted by the nnin institutions of the natiooal 
financing system, 1950-1983, Peru. 
Banldng systcm Nonbanldng system 
Banco Agrario Conmercial banking Sub total Private financing COFIDE Sub total Total ｦｾｩ｡ｬ＠sys ern 
Year hrol.mt % .Annunt % Arrount % lm:runt % .Annunt % Am:>unt % 1\nnunt % 
1950 620 - 1,155 - 1,775 - - - - - - 1,775 
1955 1,230 14.7 2,640 18.0 3,870 16.9 - - - - - 3,870 
1960 3,230 21.3 2,415 -1.8 4,735 4.1 - - - - - 4,735 
1965 4,030 4.5 2,706 2.3 6,736 7.3 - - - - - 6,736 
1970 7,193 12.3 1,540 -10. 7 8,733 5.3 nd.a - - - - - 8,733 
1971 7,554 5.0 1,513 -1.7 9,067 3.8 ro. - nd. - nd. - 9,067 3.8 
1972 8,221 8.8 1,608 6.2 9,829 8.4 15 - nd. - 15 - 9,844 8.5 
1973 8,489 3. 2 1,473 -8.3 9,962 1.3 20 33.3 nd. - 20 33.3 9,982 1.4 
1974 9,240 8.8 1,265 -14. 1 10,505 5.4 60 200.0 nd. - 60 200.0 10,565 5.8 
1975 9,369 1.3 1,102 - 12.8 10,471 -ü.3 60 o nd. - 60 o 10,531 -ü.3 
1976 8,911 -4.8 905 -17.8 9,816 -6.2 50 -16.6 nd. - 50 -16.6 9,866 -6.3 
1977 7,890 -11.4 722 -20.2 8,612 -12.2 32 -36.0 559 - 591 1,022.0 9,173 -7 .o ...... 
...... 
1978 6,728 -14.7 455 -36.9 7,183 -16.5 21 -34.3 529 -5.3 550 -1.9 7,733 -15.6 
1979 6,235 -7.3 378 -16.9 6,613 -7.9 38 80.9 354 -33.0 392 -28.7 7,005 -9.4 
1980 8,506 36.4 516 36.5 9,022 36.4 41 7.8 
1981 10.033 18.0 843 63.4 10,876 20.5 64 56.1 
1982 8,794 -12.3 1,010 19.8 9,808 -9.8 89 39.1 
1983 - - 960 -4.3 - - 59 -33.7 
a . nd. = ro data available. 
9XJRCE: Peru: El Agro en Cifras. 
Table 5. Agricultura! credit share in total credit (%) granted by the different sectors of the 
national financing systcm, 1950-1980 , Peru . 
Bankins Sl_Stem 
Banking Cornmercial Nonbanking 
Year improvement banking Total system 
1950 28.3 12 . 3 15.3 -
1955 23.5 16 . 3 18 . 0 -
1960 48 . 9 14.4 25.0 -
1965 42 . 4 11.0 19 . 6 -
1970 49.0 6.6 22 . 6 nd . a 
1971 45.7 5.5 20.2 nd. 
1972 41.1 5 . 1 19.0 o. 1 
1973 37.7 4.4 17 . 6 o. 1 
1974 38 .6 4 . 1 18 . 8 0 . 3 
1975 36.3 3.3 17.3 0.3 
1976 35.5 3.0 18.1 0.3 
1977 33 . 5 2 . 8 17 . 4 3.6 
1978 33.4 2 . 2 16 . 7 4 . 0 
1979 36.1 1.7 16.9 4.3 
1980 42 .0 1.9 17.0 nd. 
a . nd . = no data available . 
SOURCE: 1950-1960 Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros . 
1965- 1979 Cuentas Financieras del Perú BCR , cited by Salaverry Llosa, op.cit . 
1979-1980 Cuentas Financieras del Perú BCR . 
Financing 
system 
15.3 
18 . 0 
25.0 
17.1 
17 . 9 
15 . 8 
14.8 
13.9 
14.5 
13 . 4 
13.5 
14 . 0 
13 . 7 
14.5 
nd . 
...... 
!'..: 
Table 6. Loans (mi.llioo.s of Sols) granted by Banco Agrario by type of crop, 196(}-1983, Peru. 
Cottcn Rice Coffee Sugarcane Fruit Maize Po tato Wheat Other Total 
Year Anount % Annunt % hrolmt % Annlmt % Annmt % Arrount % Atrount % /llrount % Arrount % Alrount ｾ＠
1960 441 59.2 128 17. 2 35 4.7 4 - 26 3.4 22 2.9 411 5.9 9 1.2 35 4.7 744 100.0 
1965 846 55.5 203 13.3 95 6.2 34 2. 2 50 3.2 121 7.9 82 5.3 S 0. 3 88 5.7 1,524 100.0 
1970 855 27.9 1,037 33.9 250 8.1 100 3.2 117 3.8 223 7.2 224 7.6 4 0.1 239 7.8 3,058 100.0 
1971 1,235 31 .0 1,246 31.3 245 6.1 324 8. 1 124 3.1 333 8.3 165 4.1 14 0.3 272 6.9 3,976 100.0 
1972 1,244 31.9 1,120 29.1 212 5.5 268 6.9 132 3.4 360 9.3 205 5.3 13 0.3 310 8.0 3,84!. 100.0 
1973 1,778 34.3 1,568 30. 2 168 3.2 364 7.0 169 3. 2 412 7.9 291 5.6 13 0.2 406 7.9 5,178 100.0 
1974 2,414 33.1 2,130 29.3 244 3.3 640 8.7 247 3.4 566 7. 7 514 7 .o 62 0.8 463 6.4 7,283 100.0 
1975 2,552 22.6 3,956 35.0 351 3.1 561 4.9 475 4. 2 1,388 12.3 1,056 9.3 85 0.7 857 7.6 11,282 100.0 
1976 3,827 24.1 5,599 35. 3 422 2.6 421 2.6 614 3.8 2,042 12.9 1,414 8.9 85 0.5 1,439 9.0 15,865 100.0 
1977 4,964 23.5 7,197 34.1 726 3.4 713 3.3 847 4.0 2,416 11.4 2,315 10.9 101 0.3 1,820 8.6 21,099 100.0 
1978 10,133 32.1 8,884 28. 2 1,639 5.2 726 2.3 1,644 5.2 3,112 9.8 3,552 11.2 144 0.4 1,654 5.2 31,488 100.0 
1979 22,031 32.9 18,733 28.0 3,028 4.5 2,687 4.0 2,584 3.8 5,253 7.8 5,160 7.7 270 0.4 7,053 10.5 66,804 100.0 
1980 40,222 21.3 34,252 18.2 5,910 3.1 8,415 1.3 (1) (1) 7,201 3.8 13,571 7. 2 394 0.3 84 ,681 44 .9 188,646 100.0 ｾ＠
1981 50,806 23.8 76,734 35.9 4,654 2.1 12,660 5.8 (1) (1) 14,217 6.7 29,985 14.0 432 2.0 23,942 11 .2 213,430 100.0 w 
1982 62,658 22.2 111,641 39.5 6,528 2.3 12,772 4.5 (1) (1) 21,188 7.5 28,144 9.9 282 0.09 39,254 13.9 282,467 100.0 
1983 96,265 18.1 244 ,583 45.9 16,131 3.0 20,467 3.8 (1) (1) 33,137 6.2 64, 188 12.1 302 0.05 57,178 10.7 532,251 100.0 
SOORCE: El Agro en Cifras. 
Table 7. Area (ha) rcceiv-lng credit f rc.m the Banco Agrario according to type of crop, 1970-1983, Peru. 
Sugar 
Year Cotton Rice ｾｨｬｺ･＠ Coffee Po tato Sorghun Bean Wheat cane Jute Other Total 
1970 77 ,926 86,604 32,500 34,950 15,075 2,750 6,908 1,057 4,588 4,368 30,412 297 ,138 
1971 100,899 90,929 46,731 36,321 11,111 5,700 9,036 2,900 14,222 5,439 26,998 350,286 
1972 91 ,712 71 ,628 47 ,504 27 ,743 13,033 9,359 9,969 2,555 15,066 3,505 26,781 318,595 
1973 111,542 87,159 49 ,325 21,426 15,351 7,170 10,742 2,165 11,405 2,455 31,749 350,489 
1974 116,508 83,317 49,698 25 ,030 21,732 5,095 11,206 7,950 11,733 1,188 36,190 369,647 
1975 101,862 120,173 82,378 26,320 28,383 12,869 13,466 7, 783 16,246 1,899 54,422 465,301 
1976 106 ,418 125 ,187 103,612 28,329 29,664 21,370 14,035 5,936 9,109 3,115 58,730 505,505 
1977 97,896 122,338 94,879 30,573 31,079 23,624 12,347 5,476 9,044 4,461 55,215 486,932 
1978 106,718 105,039 78,633 43,729 31,482 18,017 13, 713 4,811 7,994 4 ' 7(JJ 48,200 463,190 
1979 126,363 120,690 76,244 45,292 29,505 21,034 15,243 4,579 6,335 4,891 49,590 499,946 1-' 
1980 139 ,524 130,156 68,591 49,939 38,776 21,267 13,549 4,300 8,183 2,912 51,509 528,706 .p.. 
1981 119, 133 162,598 84,889 35 ,577 50,053 15,219 18,375 3,364 11 ,484 2,837 61,987 565,516 
1982 105,138 159 ,291 79,303 36 ,883 38,889 15,687 13,569 1,787 35,002 3,505 59,273 548,337 
1983 71 ,790 161 ,306 101,712 36,391 L,6 ,008 13 ,263 4,919 805 5,104 1,936 11,080 454 ,314 
SOURCE: El Agro en Cifras. 
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Tabl¿ 8 . Public banking nominal and r eal interest r a tes (%) for 
agriculture , 1960-1 980, Peru . 
Year 
1960 
196 1 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
197 3 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
I nterest rates on loans 
for food crops 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
+ 4)b 10 (10 
10 (10 + 4)b 
24 (24 + 2)b 
27 (27 + 2) b 
Changes in 
Lima ' s Consumer 
Price Indexa 
(2) 
7.9 
5.9 
6 . 6 
6 .0 
9 . 8 
16.4 
8 . 9 
9 . 8 
19 .1 
6 . 2 
5.0 
6 .8 
7 . 2 
9 .5 
16 . 9 
23.6 
33 .5 
38 . 1 
57.9 
67.7 
App r ox . of the 
real rate 
of interest 
(1)-(2) 
- 0 . 9 
1.1 
0 . 4 
1.0 
- 2.8 
- 9 . 4 
-1. 9 
- 2 . 8 
-1 2. 1 
0 . 8 
2 . 0 
0 . 2 
- 0 . 2 
- 2 . 5 
- 9 . 9 
-16 . 6 
- 23 . 5 
- 28 . 1 
- 33 . 9 
- 40.7 
a . Conceptually , Lima 's CPI is notan adequate index by which t o deflate 
t he r eal interest rate on farm credi t. However, no other price index 
was available . 
b . The figures in parentheses show t he nominal rate of interest . For 
ins tance, 14% in 1976 : the producer was charged 10% and the Treasury 
paid the difference (4%) . 
SOURCE : Valdes and Alvarez. 
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Concluding comments on agricultura! policies 
Valdes and Alvarez analyzed the growth of agriculture among different 
commodity groups over the past three decades. They show how production 
of food for urban consumption, that is, rice, beef, pork, poultry, and 
mil, had a fairly dynamic growth rate of 3.5% or more over the period. 
Production of export crops, that is, cotton, sugar, and coffee, grew 
very fast in the fifties, stagnated in the sixties, and had a slow 
growth in the seventies. Aggregate production of Sierra items such as 
wheat, barley, potatoes, and maize virtually had no growth at all during 
these 3 decades. 
In response to protectionism, the food industry grew fast but with a 
high degree of concentration in terms of market power as well as 
regionally. Important oligopolies, receiving significant levels of 
foreign capital, emerged in wheat milling, animal feeds and poultry 
raising activities, oilseeds and fat, and dairy products. The major 
processing plants were located in and around Lima (Lajo). These 
industries found it easier to lobby for imported foodstuÍfs which 
conveniently arrived at the port, were of homogeneous quality, and were 
accompanied by credit packages and other attractive concessions, than to 
purchase those inputs produced by their own country. 
As a result, the emergence of important food and animal-feed 
processing industries in the country was not accompanied by a 
significant response in the production of local raw materials. 
The general policy scheme leaves perishables (and therefore not 
tradeable at a market disadvantage within the system. Tradeables are 
protected by exchange rate distortions linked to protectionism and by 
the implicit and explicit set of consumer and producer subsidies 
directed to these crops. Nontradeables such as potatoes and cassava are 
therefore produced and marketed within a high cost structure. 
Status Quo of Cassava in Peru: Supply and Distribution 
Fresh cassava is an important staple in the rural sector of Peru, where 
it contributes about 3% of the caloric intake of the population. It is 
also important in the Selva where per capita annual consumption is over 
150 kilos and in sorne areas represents 3% of food expenditures. 
According to the ENCA survey of 1972, Lima accounts for 8% of the total 
national consumption, while the rural areas account for 72% of that 
total. The survey established that about 65% of root and tubers, 
especially cassava, are consumed in the Selva where 75% of cassava in 
Peru is produced on family farms (Table 9). 
Total cassava production declined atan annual rate of 7.5% over the 
1966-83 period (Table 10). Most of the production corees from the Selva 
(75%). Cajamarca is the major producer with 25% of the total, most of 
which comes from Jaen in the northern Selva. Then comes Loreto with 15% 
(in the Selva) and Cuzco (1 2%) in the Sierra (Table 11). 
Clearly, the rapid process of urbanizat ion which occurred in Peru 
during the past three decades has been detrimental to the consumption of 
Table 9 . Annual consumption of cassava and telative i mpor tance in the food budget , 1972 , Peru . 
North Upper Lower North Metropolitan 
coas t Selva Selva Si erra Lima 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
% Exp . food 0.91% 1. 20% 1. 30% 1.70% 2 . 90% 0 . 80% 1 . 40% Lower 
Kg/family 10.1 76 . 5 99 . 9 196 . 0 na na na income level 
Centxal South South Centxal Medium 
coast coas t Sierra Sierra income level 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rura l Urban Rural 
% Exp. food 0 . 4% 0 . 4% 0. 5% 0 . 4% 0 . 1% o . 1% 0.20% 0.3% Uppex 
Kg/family 22 . 6 16.0 28 . 0 15.0 l. O 0 . 5 9 . 6 5 . 4 income level 
SOURCE: ENCA . Na tional Survey on Food Consumption. 
0 . 4 1% 
24 . 0 
0 . 4% 
21. 0 
0 . 2% 
12 . 9 
1-' 
-.....! 
Table 10 . Produc tion and trade of major carbohydrates (in thousands of tons), Peru. 
Production Imports Populat. (in mil-
\<!hite Soft White Yellow maize lions) 
Year Cassava Potato rice maize Wheat rice and sorghum Wheat 
1960 413 . 6 1,397.8 357.6 146 . 1 38.2 0.8 349 . 4 10.0 
1961 406.8 1,492.3 331.9 153.9 12. 9 21.4 416.3 10 . 3 
1962 390.1 1,416 . 2 374 . 2 152.8 1. 2 10.0 485.0 10.7 
1963 437.6 .1,427 . 0 269 . 9 152 . 6 1.4 7 . 5 362.3 11.0 
1964 496 . 5 1,531.1 351.5 143 . 2 47.6 15.7 392.7 11.4 
1965 449.3 1,568. 2 290 . 5 33 .4 146.7 91.9 4.6 463.5 11.7 
196(¡ 486.8 1,498 . 9 374 . 0 108.5 145 .0 78 . 7 6 . 7 493.1 12.0 
1967 506.8 1,711.7 461.4 119.7 152.2 58.8 C.9 492 . 6 12.4 
1968 399 .1 1,526.3 286.2 89 .0 112 . 9 47.6 59.1 629.6 12.7 
1969 449 . 9 1,855.5 444.4 121.8 136.7 37.0 6 . 3 681.7 13.1 
498 . 3 586.7 133.4 125 . 4 ....... 1970 1,929.5 15 .3 1.7 521.6 13.5 co 
1971 481.9 1,967.9 591.1 136.9 122.2 0.0 0.4 695.6 13.8 
1972 446 . 0 1,713.4 482 . 3 144.9 122.1 0.0 104 . 1 618.0 14.2 
197 3 460.3 1, 713.1 483.5 148.8 122 . 6 (55.2)a 223.2 389.4 14.6 
1974 468.9 1,722.4 494.2 151.8 127.4 (6 . 5) 238 .2 586.8 15.0 
197 5 399.7 1,639.6 536 . 8 157 . 8 126.3 78 . 2 362 . 7 797 . 9 15.4 
1976 402.5 1, 667.0 570.4 145.2 127.5 81.8 278 .1 601.1 15.8 
1977 414 . 0 1,615.6 594.0 230.6 115.4 0.0 222 .9 842.3 16.2 
1978 410.0 1,695.3 467.8 210 .8 104.4 26 . 4 149.5 686 . 1 16.7 
1979 402.6 1,695 .1 560.4 213.1 102.1 204.4 153 . 8 798 . 2 17.1 
1980 352.5 1,379.7 420.4 151.8 77. 1 226 . 1 500 . 0 854.8 17.6 
1981 327 . 1 1 , 678 . 6 712 . 1 196 . 9 118 . 5 105.7 503 .0 927.5 18. 1 
1982 324 .1 1, 799.6 775.5 232.9 100 . 9 58.9 530.0 991 . 7 18.6 
1983 361. 3 1,199 . 8 797.6 173 . 1 75.8 95 . 3 425 . 0 967.0 19.2 
1984 356 . 8 1,462 . 6 1,133 . 8 205 . 5 88 . 2 47 . 6 115 . 0 964 . 0 19 . 6 
a . Numbers in brackets signify exports. 
SOURCE: Ministerio de Agricultura. Peru: El Agro en Cifras. 
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Table 11 . Cassava production area (ha) by agricultural 
region, Peru. 
Agricultural region Total 
Total 361385 
Tumbes 
Piura 2734 
Lambayeque 13688 
La Libertad 12410 
Ancash 9814 
Lima 8785 
lea 1056 
Arequipa 878 
Moque gua 
Tacna 
Cajamarca 86232 
Amazonas 17074 
San Martin 25554 
Huanuco 16628 
Paseo 11585 
Junin 20395 
Huancavelica 
Ayacucho 7474 
Apurimac 87 
Cuzco 41817 
Puno 1691 
Lo reto 56081 
Ucayali 16249 
Madre de Dios 11154 
SOURCES: Ministerio de Agricultura , OSE . 
Boletín Estadístico de la Producción Agrícola, 1983. 
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fresh cassava in the country. Transport costs from the Selva to t he 
coastal urban settlements are high due to high losses in 
commercialization. \{hile other carbohydrates receive government support 
and are given massive subsidies such as wheat, maize , and rice, cas sava 
is not subsidized and therefore is more expensive to the consumer 
(Table 12). 
Fresh cassava consumption. In the ｭｩｾ Ｍｳｩ ｸ ｴｩ･ｳＬ＠ per capita 
consumption of cassava in Peru was around 40 kilos while in the 
mid-eighties it was about 18 kilos, which corresponds to a rate of 
growth of -4. 9% per year in 1966-83 (Tables 13 and 14) . 
Lima accounts for about 8% of the national market, or a r ound 30 , 000 
tons, resulting in a consumption of 5 kilo s per capita annually . A 
survey conducted by Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT) 
in 1986 among 170 household$ reveals that cassava consumption decreases 
as income rises. It is consumed 1.5 times per week, mostly at lunch , 
and peaks during the months of December, January, and February 
(Table 15). 
The survey reveals that cassava is a preferred foo d by consumers 
but that it is difficult to store , its quality varíes greatly , and it is 
expensive (Table 14). All these features are closely related to the 
perishability of the product. Reducing perishability is therefore a 
must if fresh cassava consumption is t o increase in the Peruvian urban 
markets. 
By February 1986, when the survey was conduc ted, a picture of high 
marketing margins, t ypical of other years, was found in the Sat ipo- Li ma 
cassava traders chain (Table 15). 
Econometric ana l ysis . The declining per capita consumption of 
cassava in Peru (at an annual 4 . 9% in 1966-83) was accompanied by a 
rapid trend of urbanization in the country and by government monopolies 
to ensure abundant and cheap supplies of wheat and rice which showed 
markedl y low prices with respect to tha t of cassava (Table 12). At the 
same time, the country underwent a period of deep recession associated 
with a sharp decline in real per capita income at 1. 2% per year over 
1966-83. 
The model used estimates per capita consumption of cassava as being 
dependent upon its own price, the price of other carbohydrates, per capita 
income, and a proxy for urbanization . Money variables are all in 
constant prices . 
The proxy for urbanization is intended to capture the fact that due to 
the high perishability of the crop, an increasing degree of concentration 
of consumers in urban areas means a reduction in the level of 
competitiveness in the markets for fresh cassava. The reduction i s a 
consequence of the emergence of natural barriers to entr y and very high 
risks confronted by distant suppliers . Consequently , price increases 
are higher than they would have been in a more competitive environment. 
Results show significant responses in per capita consumption of f r csh 
cassava to its own price, the price of wheat and rice, and the variable 
for urbanization, while per capita income i s not a significant variable 
at this level of aggregation (Table 16). 
Table 12 . Retail prices of carbohydrates ｳｯｵｲ｣･ｾ＠ (in Sols per kilo), Peru. 
White Soft CPI 
Year Cassava Patato rice maize Bread general 
1960 2 . 15 2 . 05 3 . 30 2.20 4 . 7 
1961 2.10 2.06 3 . 15 2.25 4.9 
1962 2.08 2 . 08 3 . 04 2.31 5 . 3 
1963 2.65 2 . 65 . 3 . 63 2 . 67 5 . 6 
1964 2 . 68 2. 61 4 . 18 2.85 6.1 
1965 4.13 4 . 16 4 . 30 3 . 60 4 . 03 7 . 8 
1967 4 . 04 3.32 5.60 3.90 4. 15 8.5 
1968 4 . 86 3.95 6 . 86 '• . 70 4.25 1 o. 1 
1969 5 . 07 4.29 7. 30 4.79 4 . 40 10 . 8 
1970 5.32 4 . 06 8 . 80 5.17 4 . 50 11.3 
1971 5 . 68 3 . 96 8.80 5 . 64 4 . 50 12 . 1 
1972 5 . 70 S . 11 8 .80 5 . 87 4 . 50 13 . o 
1973 5 . 96 6 . 12 8 . 80 6 . 58 5 . 40 14.2 
1974 5 . 58 5 . 47 10 . 56 7 . 75 6 . 50 16.6 N 
1975 9 . 91 9 . 17 13.16 9 . 63 7. 80 20 . 5 1-' 
1976 10.96 9.39 18 . 14 12.86 12.50 27 . 4 
1977 14.26 18 . 57 23 . 35 17 . 56 15 . 17 37 . 8 
1978 20 . 06 18.61 36 . 52 28 . 50 27 . 29 59 . 6 
1979 47.96 39.88 67 . 67 47 . 82 43 . 86 100 . 0 
1980 84 . 27 89.20 94 . 42 136 . 72 68.23 159 . 2 
1981 145 . 71 110 . 40 143.78 282.41 76 . 95 279 . 2 
1982 21l.lt5 286.47 227 . 36 445 . 00 100.00 459.2 
1983 595.76 689 . 76 468 . 54 1,054 . 00 573 . 36 969.5 
1984 774 . 67 783 . 05 1,235 . 28 1,558.00 1,205.26 2 , 038 . 1 
SOURCE: INIPA , Datanpro, Ag. 1985. 1973 Prices. 
Table 13 . Per capita consumption of selected carbohydrates (in kilos per year), Peru . 
White Soft Share of 
Year Cassava Potato rice maize Wheat Total cassava 
(%) 
1960 41.3 139.S 26 . S 14 . 6 
1961 39.4 144 . 6 22 . 4 14 . 9 
1962 36 . 3 131.9 23 . 4 S9 . 4 
1963 39 . 6 129 . 2 16 . S 46.6 
1964 43.7 134 . 7 23 . S 47.2 
196S 38 . 4 134 . 1 21.9 2 . 9 S2 . 2 249 . S 1S . 4% 
1966 40 . S 124 . 6 2S . 2 9 . 0 S3 . 1 2S2.4 16 . 0% 
1967 41.0 138.4 28.2 9 . 7 S2.1 269 . 3 1S.2% 
1968 31.4 120 . 0 17 . 6 7.0 S8 . 4 234 . 3 13 . 4% 
1969 34.4 141.8 24 . 6 9.3 62 . S 272 . 7 12 . 6% 
1970 37 . 0 143 . 3 30 . 0 9 . 9 48.1 268 . 3 13 . 8% 
1971 34.9 142 . 3 28.6 9 . 9 S9 . 2 274.9 12 . 7% N 
1972 31.4 120 . 7 22 . 8 10 . 2 S2 . 1 237 . 1 13 . 2% N 
1973 31.6 117 . S 19.7 10.2 3S.1 214 . 0 14 . 7% 
1974 31.3 llS . o 21.8 10 . 1 47 . 7 22S . 9 13.9% 
197S 26 . 0 106 . S 26.8 10.2 60.0 229 . S 11.3% 
1976 2S . 4 10S.4 27.6 9.2 46 . 1 213 . 7 11.9% 
1977 2S.S 99.4 24 . S 14.2 S8 . 9 222 . 6 11 . 4% 
1978 24 . 6 101.6 19 . 8 12.6 47.4 206.0 11 . 9% 
1979 23.S 98.9 29 . 9 12.4 S2 . S 217.1 10 . 8% 
1980 20.0 78 . 3 24 . 6 8 . 6 S2 . 9 184 . 3 10 . 8% 
1981 18.1 92.6 30.2 10 . 9 S7.7 209 . S 8.6% 
1982 17 . 4 96.6 30.0 12 . S S8 . 6 21S . 1 8 . 1% 
1983 18.9 62.6 31.2 9 . 0 S4 . 4 176 . 1 10 . 7% 
1984 18 . 2 74.S 40 . 3 10 . S S3 . 6 197 . 0 9 . 2% 
SOURCE: Compiled by author, based on: Peru : El Agro en Cifras; and INE. 
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Table 14 . Responses (%) of consumer s to survey on cassava, potato, rice, and sweet 
po t ato , Peru . 
These products cannot be 
easily stored 
Quality of these products 
is too variable 
Much of these products is 
wasted during preparation 
Risky to buy these products 
because of their quality 
These products were bought 
on day of consumption 
These products are easy to 
prepare 
These ar e very nutri t ional 
products 
These products are ah.,rays 
availab l e 
These products are tasty 
These products are indispen-
sable in meals 
At the moment these products 
have a good price 
SOURCE: CIAT Survey, 1986 . 
Cassava Po tat o 
85 36 
80 80 
32 50 
85 51 
79 35 
83 97 
71 89 
62 64 
75 88 
40 88 
32 50 
Rice 
24 
52 
67 
30 
27 
93 
44 
85 
78 
85 
67 
Sweet 
potato 
28 
53 
56 
35 
32 
87 
64 
78 
76 
41 
56 
Table 15. Monthly wholesale and retail marketing margins (%) for cassava, potato1 and plantain, 1984 , Lima, Peru . 
Average Jan. Feb. Mar . Apr. May June July Aug . Sept. Oct. Nov . Dec . 
51.7 Cassava 49.0 43.0 30 . 4 51.1 56 . 3 73 . 9 52 . 2 54 . 2 62 . 6 52.6 52 . 9 57 . 2 
33 .9 Patato 41.0 28 . 7 35.2 48 . 5 47 . 9 44 . 4 35 . 4 39 . 9 33 . 9 11.7 20 . 5 35 . 9 
32.7 Plantain 23 . 1 40.8 32 . 1 19 . o 25 . 6 12 . 8 23 . 9 59 . 8 42.3 65 . 0 23 . 9 32.8 
CASSAVA: February 1985, market ing margins , Satipo- Lima . 
Farro price (Satipo Area) 1 . 20 Intis/kg 
\.fuolesale price, Lima 4 . 00 I n tis/kg 
Retail price, Lima 6 . 50 Intis/kg 
Transport cost, Satipo-Lima 1.00 Intis/kg 
SOURCE: Compiled by author from Ministerio de Agricultura; INIPA. 
Table 16. Summary of annual rates of growth (%), Peru. 
Meats 
Per capita consumption 
lleef 
Por k 
Poultry 
Poultry total production 
Real retail prices 
Beef 
Beef 
Poultry 
ReJative price 
Beef/Poultry 
Other 
Total population 
Urban population 
Per capita real income 
Maize and sorghum imports 
SOURCE : Compiled by author . 
- 2 . 6 
-0.9 
7.0 
9 . 7 
2.3 
-0.9 
-4.1 
6.3 
2.7 
3 . 9 
-1.2 
3. 7 
Crops 
Per capita consumption 
Cassava 
Potato 
Rice 
Wheat 
Haize 
Cassava total production 
Real retail prices 
Cassava 
Po tato 
Rice 
\.Jheat 
Naize 
Relative price 
Cassava and wheat 
Anima l concentrate 
Maize and sor ghum production 
-4.9 
-3.5 
1.1 
o .1 
1.4 
- 2 . 2 
0.2 
1.8 
-1.5 
-0.8 
4 . 5 
1. 3 
4.6 
0.4 
tv 
V> 
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The results confirm the hypotheses that government policies which 
protect and subsidize wheat and rice are partly responsible for the 
lower consumption of this local staple, and that urbanization is also 
responsible for t he reduction in demand . 
Potential demand for cassava 
Cassava has the potential to become a basic carbohydrate source in 
Peru in the near future . It can contribute directly to improve the 
calorie intake of t he population and, very important ly, it can also 
contribute to the production of animal meats by entering in feed 
formulations, complementing other energy sources that are currently 
de ficit in their local production (mostly sorghum and maize). 
Carbohydrate foods . Carbohydrate consumption has experienced 
important changes in composition toward grains and away from roots and 
tubers during the past two decades, as a result of government policies 
directed to favor cereals and exclude roots and tubers from its plans. 
While per capita consumption of cassava and potatoes dropped from 
4.9% in 1966 to 3.5% in 1983 , that of rice and soft maize increased at 
1 . 1% and 1.4%, respect ively, and wheat showed no significant change at 
0 . 1% per year. Furthermore, t he relative prices of cassava and potatoes 
increased with respect to those of rice and wheat . Soft maize exhibits 
higher per capita consumption and higher real retail prices. This 
points at a difficult data problem rather than consumer behavior; it is 
difficult to separate data on soft maize from that on yellow maize for 
direct human consumption , onfarm feeding, and industrial use, even when 
accounting for changes in onfarm consumption and commercialization of 
the two kinds of maize . For that reason, data for soft maize exhibits 
atypical behavior (Table 12 and 13). 
Annual per capita consumption of wheat oscillated around 55 kilos 
over the 1966-83 period. Local production increased from 150 , 000 t ons 
in the early sixties to just over 80,000 t ons in the eighties, while 
imports increased from about 400,000 tons to almost 1 million tons 
during the same period . The price of both domestically produced and 
imported wheat was controlled until 1984 at below world levels on 
entering flour mills . Domestic wheat (mostly soft whole grain) for uses 
other than f lour milling did not have a controlled price. In 1981, 
nearly 120,000 tons were produced locally and yet only 67 tons, that is, 
almost nil, went to milling (Orden et al . ): it is mostly consumed 
directly, cspecially in the Sierra . The milling industry is therefore 
totally dependent on imports . 
Imports are based on a quota syst em for millers administered by ENCI. 
Starting in 1984 , millers (who now absorb 90% of local production) must 
buy a share of local wheat at free and higher-than-import prices. A 
consumer wheat-flour price subsidy exists so that mills have paid much 
less for flour going to bread and noodles, which are basic items in the 
diets of poor Peruvians (Asagro). 
In 1985 , the new APRA Government again reinforced this position of 
making wheat one of the basic foodstuffs by formulating a strategy of the 
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popular bread based on a l ess restrictive milling rate of 87% (in 
contr ast to the usual 75%) and providing a higher subsidy fo r the 
resulting bread. For a country with serious fo reign exchange 
restrictions, this strategy , based on imported food , may be difficult to 
maintain . 
Rice is the other staple cereal in Peru . ECASA has had monopoly 
rights t o mar ke t both domestic and imported rice. Mill ing of rice is 
perfo rmed by prívate firms under contrac t to ECASA. The price of 
unpolished rice is fixed by t he gover nment. To sell rice t o a local 
mill, the producer needs an income arder f rom the r egional ECASA office . 
In Lima ECASA sells the rice directly t o retailers and charges sorne 
transport costs. In other parts of the country , retaile rs mus t pick up the 
rice f rom ECASA or the designated rice mill . 
Producer prices have maintained around a 15% margin in favor of Selva 
producers over coas t al producers. Consumer prices f or ordinary rice (up 
to 35% of broken grains) are fixed , while s uperior (up t o 2%) and extra 
(up to 5% broken grains) qualities are uncontrolled . The price 
structure that appears in Table 17 still prevails but due t o rampant 
inflation, producer prices of polished rice equi valent were S/3500 in 
ea rly 1985 while the consumer price of ordina r y rice wen t up to S/2910 
(Programa de Abastecimiento, Arroz, 1985) . In 1986 , paddy rice hada 
suppor t price of US$230, or about US$350 for whit e rice equivalent a t 
14% humidity, a price well above the import cif (Callao) pri ce of 
US$2 15 . 
Per cap ita consumption of white rice is clase t o 30 kilos per year 
(45 kilos of paddy rice) . About three quarters of production comes from 
the northern part of t he country with the Sel va (San Martin, Loreto , 
Ucayali) showing a s i gnificant growth . However , commercialization of 
surpluses from the Selva constitutes a maja r bottleneck due t o 
inadequa t e roads to Lima (Programa de Abas t ecimiento, Arroz 1985) . 
In the early eighties , rice was the s ubject of massive s t a te support 
and promotion . While in 1980 , t he per cent ages of food subsidies destined 
for imported whea t and r ice were 28% and 17% , in 1983 these per centages 
were up t o 32% and 53 %, respectively. I n the same per iod, the rice 
production a rea financed by BAP increased by 25% and t ot al production 
a lmos t doubled f r om 420,000 to 791,000 t ons . Ri ce production peaked in 
1984 with over 1 million t ons being produced . By 1985 , product ion was 
around 950 ,000 tons and for 1986 it was much lower and about 350 , 000 
tons of rice had to be imported (Noticias Fedearr oz , Marzo , 1987) . The 
decrease in production is the r esul t of both drought in t he nor t h and a 
new support progr am for maize which s tarted in December 1985 that gave 
maize a higher s upport price (I3. 30/kg ve r s us 13 . 20/kg fo r rice), as 
well as amp l e credit facili ties . 
I n Lambayeque , t he most important rice-producing department , rice 
production a r ea dropped from 52 , 000 ha in 1984- 85 t o 4 , 400 ha in 
1985- 86 , while maize i ncr eased from 7 , 000 hato 15 , 000 ha and cassava 
decreased f rom 488 ha t o 45 1 ha (CIPA II , Ing. J . Celis, unpublished) . 
Dr ought and the new price-and- credit policies have had a negative impact 
on r ice , a positive i mpact on maize and no effec t on cassava . 
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Table 17. Dis tribution of costs in the production, processing and marketing 
of rice, and official prices, September, 1982 , Peru. 
Distribution of costs (%) 
Farm price (polished rice equivalent) 
Processing 
Hulling 
National weighted transportation 
Spoilage 
Other 
Wholesale profit 
Retail distribution 
Local transportation 
Spoilage 
Other 
Retailer profit 
7 . 4 
9 . 3 
0 . 6 
2 . 8 
0 . 0 
1.8 
0 . 0 
l. O 
2. 9 
Official prices 
Farm price 
Coas t al 
Selva 
Processed prices 
Gr ade of rice 
Ordinary (corriente) 
Superior 
Extra 
Imported 
Unpolished rice 
200 
220 
Wholesale 
252 
436 
591 
350 
Percent of final value 
74 . 2 
20 . 1 
5.7 
100 .0 
Polished 
rice equivalent 
300 
330 
Retail 
270 
480 
650 
385 
SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture (DGAIC). Pr ogramas de abastecimiento 1981: 
arroz. Lima, Peru . 
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Per capita consumption of potatoes has been decreasing rapidly , at 
3 . 5% per year in 1966-83, while its real retail price increased at an 
annual 1.8% during the same period. Most of this decrease carne as a 
reduction in production in central Sierra because of a rapid growth in 
production costs, a deterioration in the terms of trade for potatoes, 
and the deficient and decreasing government support activities for the 
crop in the area in terms of research, extension, and credit (Scott). 
Again, government action appears as the majar influence encouraging 
dietary patterns away from locally produced roots and tubers to local 
and imported cereals . 
Meat consumption. Total per capita consumption of meats has grown 
relatively fast in Peru in the 1966-83 period due to a rapid expansion 
in production of poultry neat. The three meats added up to about 18 
kilos per capita each year by the mid- eighties with half of those coming 
from poultry (Table 18). Fish consumption is relatively high atan 
annual 12 kilos per capita, but has been decreasing (Tagle). In the 
mid- sixties, the relation of beef to poultry consumption was around 2 . 0 
while in the mid-eighties it reversed to 0.55 (from half to almost twice 
as much poultry). The relation of prices of poultry to beef went from 
1.4 to 0.7 . Clearly, consumption of poultry responded significantly to 
relative price variations. 
While per capita poultry consumption increased at an annual 7% in 
1966-83 , that of beef decreased at an annual 2.6%, and per capita pork 
consumption decreased at an annual 0.9%. Consequently, animal feed 
demand grew at 4.6% per year . Since interna! production of maize and 
sorghum was stagnant, feed grain imports increased atan annual 3.7%. 
A demand equation for per capita poultry consumption was estimated, 
showing significant elasticities for its own price, for the cross price 
elasticities, indicating substitution effects caused by the higher beef and 
pork prices, and for the income elasticity (Table 19). 
Metropolitan Lima absorbs 47.5% of the national production of poultry 
meat and eggs. According to the Consumer Price Index Weights, these two 
products account for 6.3% of the total household expenditures (Peru: El 
Agro en Cifr as; Malarin). An important se&ment of the market 
constitutes sales of live animals (over 75% according to APA) and this 
helps to explain the rapid growth of this t ype of meat among all 
segments of the population, especially in those which do not have access 
to refrigerators . 
The rapid growth of the poultry and feed industry has not been 
accompanied by a more competitive structure. In 1979, Bunge, Nicolini, 
and Purina had 80% of the feed producing market (Laja). 
On top of this oligopolistic structure, grain imports account for over 
a third of grain requirements for feed, and mai ze imports are controlled 
by quotas assigned to prívate animal-feed mixing mills. ENCI is in 
charge of both domestic and foreign maize purchases. For stimulating 
production, maize has an attractive support price: by 1986 it was 
13.30/kg (or US$240/ton), higher than that of rice at 13 . 20/kg . 
Tabl e 18 . Pr oduct ion , trade , retail pr ices , a nd per capi t a consumption of Mea t s , Peru . 
Proauct:ron Pe r caE1f a consumE t: Ior 
Year Beef Por k Poul t ry Beef Popul . Nomina l re t a i l Eri ces in Li ma CPI Beef Por k Poult1 
(t in t housands) impor ts (mi l lions) Beef Por k Poultr y gene r al (kg/person/year) 
1962 66 . 7 40 . 5 22 . 3 3 . 7 10 . 73 16 . 2 17 . 3 37 . 4 5 . 3 6 . 6 3 . 8 2 . 1 
1963 69 . 5 44 . 2 23 . 6 4 . 4 11. 04 19 . 0 20.0 37 . 4 5.6 6 . 7 4 . 0 2 . 1 
1964 81. 2 46 . 9 25 . 5 4 . 9 11. 36 20 . 6 21. 8 38 . 5 6 . 1 7 . 6 4.1 2 . 2 
1965 74 . 0 43 .1 37 . 0 6 . 4 11 . 69 25 . 8 23 . 0 40 . 5 7 . 1 6 . 9 3 . 7 3 . 2 
1966 75 . 1 41. 7 39 . 4 6 . 9 12 . 03 27 . 62 26 . 0 41. 3 7 . 8 6 . 8 3 . 5 3 . 3 
1967 75 . 7 42.9 44 .1 18 . 3 12 . 37 34 . 93 38 . 0 42 . 9 8 . 5 7 . 6 3 . 5 3 . 6 
1968 77 . S 42 . 8 46 . 5 21.3 12 . 72 35 . 5 41. 7 43 . 4 10 . 1 7 . 8 3 . 4 3 . 7 
1969 82 . 6 46 . 7 51. 3 37 . 9 13. 09 36 . 3 52 . 4 48 . 5 10 . 8 9 . 2 3 . 6 3. 9 
1970 84 . 9 46 . 5 57 . 7 38 . 3 13 . 46 38 . 8 61. 9 54 . 5 11. 3 9 . 2 3 . 5 4 . 3 
1971 89 . 5 53 . 6 63 . 6 22 . 9 13 . 83 47 . 7 66 . 7 63 . 6 12 . 1 8 . 1 3 . 9 4 . 6 
1972 85 . 3 53 . 6 92 . 6 18 14 . 20 40 . 8 68 . 8 68 . 7 13 .o 7 . 3 3 . 8 6 . 5 
1973 84 . 5 53 . 2 102 . 5 12 . 1 14 . 59 63 . 2 70 . 4 52 . 5 14 . 2 6 . 6 3 . 6 7 . 0 
1974 85 . 3 54 . 6 127.6 8 . 4 14 . 98 87 . 4 76 . 5 60 . 7 16 . 6 6 . 3 3 . 6 8 . 5 
1975 86 . 1 54 . 6 129 . 9 5 . 1 15 . 40 102 . 0 91.5 78 . 3 20 . 5 5 . 9 3 . 5 8 . 4 
1976 86 . 7 54 . 9 140 . 0 8 15 . 82 136 . 1 129 . 0 95 . 6 27 . 4 6 . 0 3.5 8 . 9 
1977 87 . 0 54 . 0 143 . 0 7 . 4 16 . 25 172 . 6 153 . 4 132 . 4 37.8 5 . 8 3 . 3 8 . 8 
1978 89 . 0 53 . 0 118 . 6 1. 2 16 . 69 257 . 4 248 . 9 223 . 8 59 . 6 5 . 4 3 . 2 7 . 1 
1979 86 . 6 52 . 5 11 8 , ll. - 0 . 5 17 . 15 410 . 4 491 . 1 386 . 7 100 . 0 5 . 0 3 .1 6 . 9 
1980 83 . 8 55 . 0 143 . 5 3 . 6 17 . 63 838 . 0 732 . 8 536 . 4 159 . 2 5 . 0 3 . 1 8 . 1 
1981 90 . 1 59 . 2 182 . 6 11.5 18 . 12 1, 516 . 0 1, 014 . 9 78 1. 8 279 . 2 5 . 6 3 . 3 10 . 1 
1982 91. 0 58 . 7 2Ql¡. 8 21.8 18 . 63 2 , 335 . 0 1, 743 . 1 1 ,176.0 459 . 2 6 . 1 3 . 2 11 . 0 
1983 110 . 7 57 . 6 206 . 3 10 . 5 19 . 16 4 , 272 . 0 3 , 240 . 0 2 , 282 . 0 969 . 5 6 . 3 3 . 0 10 . 8 
1984 103 . 1 54 . 5 181. 6 9 .1 19 . 70 9 , 076 . 0 8 , 494 . 5 5 , 360 . 8 2 , 038 .1 5 . 7 2 . 8 9.2 
SOURCE : Minist eri o de Agricul t u ra ; ! NIPA. 
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Table 19. Projected demand for cassava, 1985-2000, Peru . 
Dried cassava chips 
Multiple regression for poultry meat ､･ｾ｡ｮ､Ｌ＠ Cobb-Douglas Functional Form. 
Constant -1.03 -- real retail price of -- per capita 
Beef 
X Coefficient 0.6605 
X Value '83 6.0935048 
Beta X83 4.0587589 
X Value 2000 6.0935048 
Beta X2000 4.0585789 
Per capita poultry consumption 
Observed 1984 9.2 
Estimated 2000 12.6 
Yellow maize needs from projections: 
Assumptions 
Rates of growth 
Human population 
Per capita real income 
Real retail price poultry 
Production of yellow maize 
Conversion poultry/feed 
Ratio of meat/total poultry 
Percent poultry feed in total 
Maize in feed formulas 
Variable levels 
Human population (millions) 
1984 19.6 
2000 29 . 2 
Total production poultry meat 
1984 181.1 
2000 368 . 4 
Implied total feed needs 
1984 633 . 7 
2000 1,289.6 
Projections: 
Maize production (tons) 
Demand nonfeed uses of maize (annual growth of 2.5%) 
Implicit maize needs for feed 
Deficit (imports) of maize 
CIF price maize 
Cost of annual importations 
Percent dried cassava in feed 
Total dried cassava needs(tons) 
Fresh to dried cassava 
conversion rate 
Fresh cassava implicit needs (includes reductions in waste 
of 10% or 41,829 tons) 
Average national cassava yields 
Required hectares 
Fresh cassava, labor/ha 
Dried ｾ｡ｳｳ｡ｶ｡Ｌ＠ labor/ton New jobs generated per year 
Por k 
0.523234 
5.9221385 
3.0986642 
5. 9221385 
3 .0986642 
2.5% 
0.0% 
-1.5% 
2 . 0% 
2.8 
1. 5 
80.0% 
60 . 0% 
1,000 
686 . 4 
315.3 
773 . 7 
402.6 
Poultry 
-1. 1942 
5.5167243 
- 6.588072 
5 .2749061 
-6.299292 
115 (in US$) 
46,303 (in US$) 
10 . 0% 
129.0 
2.5 
280,559 tons 
10.5 t/ha 
26,720 
60 
6, 929 1 
In come 
0.53756 
5.0387561 
2.7086337 
5 . 0387561 
2.7086337 
(continued) 
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Table 19. (Continued . ) 
Projections for fresh cassava 
Multiple Regression for Demand for Fresh Cassava, Cobb-Douglas Functional Form. 
Constant 5.7873906 
Cassava Potato White rice Bread 
X Coef. elasticity 
X Value ' 83 
Beta X83 
X Value 2000 
Beta X2000 
-0 . 22069 
-0 . 727142 
0 . 1604730 
-0 . 887947 
0 . 1959612 
Per capita cassava consumption 
Observed 1984 
Estimated 2000 
0 . 04924 
-0. 648509 
-0.031932 
-0.648509 
-0 . 031932 
Assumptions 
Rates of growth 
Rea l retail price, cassava 
Rea l retail price, white rice 
and bread 
Per capita real income 
Human population 
Urban population 
0.313505 0.131571 
-0 . 613942 -0 . 503851 
- 0 .1 92474 - 0 . 066292 
-0 . 774748 -0 . 664657 
-0 . 242887 -0 . 087449 
18.2 
14.3 
-l. O% 
-l. O% 
0.0% 
2 . 5% 
3.0% 
Urbanization effect reduced by 1/3 
Reduction in waste with plastic 
bags 10.0% 
Fresh cassava production (1000 tons) 
1984 356.8 
2000 376.5 
Additional fresh cassava 
required (1000 tons) 
Additional hectares 
New jobs generated 
19 . 7 
1,872 
449 
Summary of joint projections for fresh and dried cassava needs 
Current cassava production, 1984 356,800 tons 
Rectares 1984 33,981 ha 
Total production projected for year 2000 657,020 tons 
Additional hectares 28 , 592 ha 
New permanent jobs generated annually 7 ,378 jobs 
Total reduction in waste (20% of f resh) 75 , 292 tons 
at 12 . 75/kg farm level 207.05 millions of 
Annual savings to the country 14 . 90 millions of 
SOURCE: ｃｯｾｰｩｬ･､＠ by author . 
Income Urbanization 
0 . 09462 
1.617159 
0 . 153015 
1.617159 
0.153015 
Intis 
US$ 
-1 . 1294 
2 . 577144 
-2 . 91062 
2 . 754229 
-3.11062 
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Maize is purchased throughout Peru by ENCI at the support price of 
I3.30/kg and is sold at that same price everywhere in the country, 
regardless of whether it is imported or domestically produced in coastal 
areas or in the Selva . This implies a subsidy for Selva maize of about 
11.50/kg, which is the 1986 estimated transport cost from the Selva and 
for coastal maize of about I0.50/kg, which is the transport cost to 
Lima, the majar user of hard yellow maize. On imported grain, the 
government makes about I1. 20/kg (exchange rate is I13.90 to the U.S. 
dallar) . 
Maize import quotas are highly valued because the homogeneity in 
the quality of imported grain surpasses that of national maize. 
Therefore, commercial millers continually press for increased quotas 
(Orden et al.). 
The coast produces 60% of the yellow maize in the country under 40% 
of the area while the Selva produces 40% under 60% of the area. Current 
yields are 2 . 8 tons/ha at the national level. In coastal areas, where 
technology is modern, yields are clase to 4 tons /ha, while in the Selva, 
with a more labor-intensive technology, y ields are around 
2 tons/ha (Table 20). 
Although the trend in production during the 1966-85 period shows 
stagnation with no increases in yield nor in area, output grew at an 
accelerated pace between 1966 and 1976, decreased rather sharply between 
1977 and 1980 (by 40.2%) due to a marked crisis in the poultry sector, 
to rebound in 1980-85 with a total increase in production of 64 .7% 
(Malarin). These changes were associated with the corresponding 
variations in area harvested. 
The rapid modernization of the poultry industry, which started in the 
sixties, brought about a marked reduction in costs of production, a 
phenomenon that was accompanied by increased demand for poultry meat and 
eggs due to the lower relative and real prices of chicken and due to the 
lack of response in production of other sources of protein. Government 
support became stronger after 1970 (Malarin). However, with the deep 
recession of the late seventies the industry faced a crisis that 
resulted in a 17.2% reduction in output between 1977 and 1979. But the 
industry recovered to grow atan annual 9.7% in 1980-85. 
I n terms of value of production, poultry mea t represented in 1970 only 
11.3% of the livestock subsector and 2.6% of the agricultural sector, 
while by 1984 those percentages were 26 . 6% for the livestock component 
and 7.4% for agriculture (Malarin) . 
The geographic pattern of consumption of poul t ry meat is uneven. 
ｾＱ･ｴｲｯｰｯｬｩｴ｡ｮ＠ Lima, with 25% of the population, absorbs 47 . 5% of total 
poultry meat. In the rural areas , consumption is 62% below the national 
average . 
After the recession, the industry carne out with a more competitive 
framework since many small industries were forced to merge if they were 
to survive (82% of existing farms stayed in the market). The economies 
of scale allowed them to produce their own feed . The market shares of 
Nicolini and Purina Peru dropped from 30 . 8% and 22.3%, respectively, in 
1976 to 13 . 7% and 7 . 2% in 1984. 
Table 20 . Production of hard yellow maize, Peru . 
Year Area (ha) Production (t) Yield (t/ha) 
Coast Selva Total Coas t Selva Total Coast Selva Total 
1970 104150 49550 153700 309805 78252 388057 2 . 975 1.579 2 . 525 
1971 109665 46765 156430 340698 73124 413822 3 .107 1.564 2 . 645 
1972 107340 46230 153570 338897 75378 414275 3 .157 1.630 2 . 698 
1973 91580 46510 138090 307351 73098 380449 3 . 356 1. 572 2 . 755 
1974 87840 47020 134860 306116 76204 382320 3 . 485 l. 621 2 . 835 
1975 103725 40060 143785 352759 67954 420713 3 . 401 1.696 2 . 926 
1976 116960 46910 163870 405444 83300 488744 3 . 467 l. 776 2 . 983 
1977 113789 52852 166641 406640 96654 503294 3 . 574 1.829 3 . 020 
1978 74474 61896 136370 268568 110575 379143 3 . 606 l. 786 2 . 780 
1979 78075 79191 157266 269538 138801 408339 3 .45 2 1.753 2 . 596 
1980 49709 71785 121494 17 3843 127013 300856 3 . 497 l. 769 2 . 476 w 
1981 61470 8 1364 142834 228011 161809 389820 3 . 709 1 . 989 2 . 729 .p. 
1982 57559 97095 144654 227035 171940 398975 3 . 944 l. 974 2.758 
1983 60504 105128 165632 210769 200766 411535 3 .484 l. 910 2 . 485 
1984 88902 109592 198494 349824 220730 570554 3 . 935 2 . 014 2 . 874 
1985 69891 105183 175074 287571 207976 495547 4 .11 5 1. 977 2 . 831 
SOURCE: Ministerio de Agricultura, Oficina Sec torial de Estadistica . 
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The animal-feed industry, by 1970, represented, in terms of total 
value of production, 65% of the agricultura! processing industries and 
1.2% of the manufacturing sector, while by 1981 those values were 12.4% 
and 2.45% (Malarin). 
By the mid-eighties, poultry feed represented 73% of the total, 
while it was 92% in 1977 (Table 21). Cattle and "others" have taken up 
the slack. 
Economic feasibility of expanding cassava use. The use of dry 
cassava in animal-feed rations is common practice in Europe, where 
current use reaches 4.5 million tons per year, and Asia. It is starting 
to take place in Latín America, where dry cassava is still an infant 
industry. Colombia now produces about 5000 tons per year of cassava 
chips and since 1986 there have been commercial drying floors in 
Ecuador , P'nama, and Mexico . 
Economic analysis reveals that, in most Latín American countries, 
cassava is economically attractive, when compared with local grains, in 
terms of the various links in the chain of activities: the producer, the 
drier, and the animal-feed manufacturer. 
The procedure of conserving fresh cassava in plastic bags treated with 
thiabendazole-based fungicide (mertect or tecto) has less commercial 
empirical evidence although, conceptually, it is obvious that a 
reduction in marketing costs will take place and that the market will 
become more competitive. A semicommercial project has been conducted in 
Bucaramanga, Colombia, with highly successful results, showing that it 
is possible to reduce marketing margins and offer a higher quality 
product to consumers at lower prices. Consumers have responded 
immediately to these changes. Field and transportation trials from 
Satipo into Lima have shown that the procedure is successful in reducing 
marketing losses and consequently costs. 
The cost structure of fresh cassava in Peru (Table 15) shows a high 
marketing margin that could be reduced with this treatment. The 
assumption that fresh cassava consumption will respond to a change in 
its own price was tested in the demand equation calculated and was 
accepted (Own-price elasticity of -0. 22) (Table 19) . \Ull supply 
respond to a higher farro price? In a competitive framework, supply for 
agricultura! products responds to changes in price both in the short and 
in the long term, with long-term changes being more marked. However, in 
a controlled pricing environment, like the one faced by Peruvian 
agriculture for the past two decades, the short-term response depends 
rather heavily on the prices, marketing environment , and stimulus not 
only for cassava but also for its close substitutes in supply and 
demand. 
Given the current level of technology used in cassava production, it 
is expected that improvements in its commercialization will stimulate use 
of better management practices , making cassava a more highly competitive 
alternative. 
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Table 21. Industrial pr oduction of feed by destination (in t ons), Peru. 
Year Poult ry Beef Por k Other 
1973 576453 29840 37978 33409 
1974 635800 32912 41888 37400 
1975 652823 33793 43010 38401 
1976 69743 1 36102 45949 41025 
1977 681371 1979 1 26714 8792 
1978 468044 12089 22823 13623 
1979 363354 19325 40496 30581 
1980 544 727 49023 43992 49712 
198 1 591597 39792 34446 50625 
1982 670308 50306 44454 49436 
1983 570366 43654 58780 53538 
1984 435104 32030 73211 54447 
SOURCE : Ninis terio de Agricultura . Programa de Abastecimiento de Alimentos 
Balanceados , 1985. DGAC. 
To tal 
678180 
748000 
768027 
820507 
736668 
516579 
453756 
687454 
716460 
814504 
726338 
594792 
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The potential of cassava resides in the Selva where conditions are 
more appropriate to its socioagronomic characteristics: an ability to 
adapt to marginal soils with low use of inputs, making it a useful low-cost 
alternative. In coastal areas, where agriculture is highly mechanized 
and intensive in the use of inputs (for example, irrigation, fertilizer, 
and herbicides), cassava plays a minor role as a diversification crop 
against the risk of water shortages. Costs of production are much 
higher than in the Selva (Tables 22 and 23). Given the high local 
demand for fresh cassava, few surpluses are generated . 
Lambayeque, the most important cassava-producing department in 
coastal areas, is an importer of the root. It comes in undetermined but 
important quantities from Machala (Ecuador) whose cassava is preferred 
to local varieties and therefore carries a higher price. In 1986, 
cassava from Machala had a retail price of around I3 . 20 per kilo while 
the local varieties could be purchased at around 12.50 per kilo. 
Another curiosity is that prices of fresh cassava in Chiclayo, (the 
largest city in Lambayeque with 500,000 people) were similar to those in 
Lima despite the fact that transport costs are much lower than those for 
Lima. 
While a farmer near Chiclayo gets about I2.00/kilo, one clase to 
Satipo (central Selva near Lima) gets 11.20/kilo, in 1986. Transport 
costs are twice as much from Satipo at I1.00/kilo compared with 
I0.50/kilo from Chiclayo. Still, cassava from the Selva would be 
cheaper than that from the north coast when taken into Lima because of 
the lower costs of production. Besides, the north coast does not have 
the capacity to respond with important additional quantities of cassava 
(outcompeting crops such as rice, cotton, maize in the limited areas of 
the coast). 
In the Selva, it is feasible to expect important increases in supply, 
given t he wide availability of land and the low costs of production per 
unit faced by cassava growers, even under present crop management 
conditions, which are far from optimal. 
The potential of the dried cassava industry in Peru has been analyzed 
by Malarin, who concludes that dried cassava is profitable to farmers, 
processors, and feed manufacturers and that it could compete with maize 
if it were granted the same transport subsidy. 
Currently, dried cassava chips have a support price of I2 . 00 per kilo 
with ENCI buying them at its warehouses in Pucalpa, Satipo, and La 
}1erced (Selva). The decree was approved in March, 1986 . At the time 
maize from the Selva had a support price of I2.6 per kilo. Therefore, 
cassava chips were priced at 80% of the price of maize. By mid-1986 the 
price of maize went up to I3.30 per kilo but that of dried cassava chips 
was not changed. As a result, maize became a much more attractive 
alternative to the farmer . 
The proposal being presented to the government by the prívate sector 
consists in pegging the support price of dried cassava chips to the price 
of maize at a fixed percentage, namely 75%. An adjustment in the price 
of maize would imply an automatic adjustment to cassava chips and would 
protect its profitability for farmers, driers, and feed manufacturers. 
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1ble 22 . Pr oduction cost of a hectare of cassava in the Selva , Peru. 
Measure Unit 
:eros unit Quantity pr ice Sub total Total 
Lrect expenses 4,635 . 69 
Soil preparat ion 396 . 00 
Rozo , tumba , picacheo, 
quema , shunteo man- da y 22 18 . 00 396 . 00 
Seedi ng 372 . 92 
Furadan 5% G kg 2 51.46 102 .92 
Seed (7000 sticks) s t ick 7 . 000 0 . 01 70 . 00 
Seed transport bag 10 2 . 00 20 . 00 
Seed and seeding 
disinfecting man- day 10 18.00 180 . 00 
\.Jeed control 540 . 00 
First man- day 07 18 . 00 126 . 00 
Second man-day 07 18.00 126 . 00 
Third man- day 07 18. 00 126.00 
Fourth man-day 09 18.00 162. 00 
Manuring 776 . 50 
Fer t ilizer s 
(for mula 46- 30- 60) 
Ur ea kg 100 3 . 72 272 . 00 
Superphosphate Ca simple kg 150 l. 71 256 . 50 
KCl kg 100 l. 98 198 . 00 
Fertilizers ' t r anspor t kg 350 0 . 04 14 . 00 
Fertilizers mixing 
and application man-day 02 18.00 36 . 00 
Phytosanitary control 423.56 
Aldrin 2 . 5% kg 22 15 . 98 351.56 
Aldrin application ( 2) man-day 4 18 . 00 72 . 00 
Harvest 940 . 00 
Container bag 200 4 . 00 400 .00 
Harves t and transpor t man-day 30 18 . 00 540 . 00 
ther expenses · ,1 86 . 71 
Social laws 50 . 76% I 965 . 97 
Unforeseen 5% 220 . 74 
1direct expenses 1,334 . 61 
Adminis t rative expenses 
8% of direct expenses 370 . 85 
Financial expenses 963 . 76 
) tal cost of production/ha 5,970.30 
ield (kg /ha) 15 , 000 
lit price 0 . 40 
rofit 30% 0 . 12 
um price 0 . 52 
)URCE: Malarin , H. 1986. Thesis. Univ . Paci fico . 
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'Table 23. Cassuva production costs, Peru . 
Teo:!onical level Hediur.: 
Sccdf:¡g time Decct:ber 
ｅｾｲｶ｣ｳ ｴ＠ t ir-.Q ａｵｾｵｳｴ＠
;.gr icul tural campaign 19 5- 1986 
Cv:;t date Hay 
Labor Units Unit Total 
Month Unit (no . ) price cost 
Soil preparation 
Han-day 4 25 lOO t;ov. 
!'ov. Han-da y 3 25 75 
llov. }1an-day 2 25 50 
1\ov. Han-day 2 25 50 
Seedir.;l 
1 25 25 Sclcction Dec. Man-da y (lndirect) seeding Dec . Man- day 9 25 225 
C:..:l tural labors 
Irrlgation Jan. - July Man-day 5 25 125 
\Jeed control Jan. -July l1an-day 7 25 175 
Manurir.g Jan . -Mar. Man- da y 3 25 75 
f,Rorqu" Februarl Man-day 3 25 75 
P.ytosar.itary control Jan .-Ju y Man-day 5 25 125 
Earvest 
:·lanua1 harves t ａｵｾｵｳｴ＠ Man-day 15 25 375 Carr,r.dores Au¡;.-.ept. Man-da y 4 25 lOO 
ｓ･Ｑ｣｣ｾＡＮｯｮ＠ and cleaning Aug.-Scpt. Han-da y 2 25 50 
Gu:ndiania Aug.-Sept. ｾｬ｡ｮ Ｍ､ ｡ｹ＠ 2 25 50 
Sub t otal o( labor !675 
Social laws (46 . 2%) 773 . 85 
Total labor work 2!:.8 . 85 
ｈ｡ｾｨｩｲＮ｣ｲｹ＠ and equiprnent 
TvRe of Hrs/dar Unit Total operation 
::0nth maC inerv (no . 2rice cost 
Aradura Nov . Trac.Rue 2 150 300 
Cruzadura Nov. Trac . Rue l 150 !50 
Surcadura De c . Yunta l 70 70 
Mochila Jan.-July Bomba 3 10 30 
Total ;r.achincry anc! equipment 550 
Inputs 
Units Unit Total 
Month Unit (no . ) price cost 
Seed (sticks) 
Fertilizers : 
Dec . kg 760 o .15 114 
Urca (467. 
Pesticides: 
'.! .N. ) Jan . -March kg 90 5.02 451 .8 
Aldrin Jan. kg 22 9 .9 217 .8 
S"vin ＸＰｾｾ＠ P. H. Jan. -Harch k E l 211.41 211.41 
,\;:odrin 400 Jan .-Harch 1 193 .75 193.75 
hTater mil m3 6 5.6 33 . 6 
Total b¡outs 1222.36 
í'rans;>or tation 
Seec!s Dec . kg 760 0 .05 38 Fertilizers ｊ｡ｮ Ｎ Ｍｾ Ｚ｡ ｲ｣ｨ＠ ｫｳｾｅ＠ 196 o. 1 19.6 Pesticides Jan.-H:trch 24 0.1 2.4 
Pro<luct Aug.-Sept. kg 12000 0.05 600 
Total transport 660 
Consolidated direc t coses (DC) 488 1. 21 
ｌｾｬｽｯ ｲ＠ cost 2448 . 85 
l!achinery and equ i pment 550 
!nputs 12:!2 . 36 
Transport 660 
1 r.d i re e t costs (IC) 1783.6755 
Ｌﾷｾ､ｭｩｮｩｳｴ＠ rat ive (8:': of DC) 390.4968 
l!nforesccn (54 of DC) ＲｾＴＮＰＶＰＵ＠
Finar,cial 1149.1182 
Total ces t 6664 . 8855 
SOt'RCE: CI?A 11. Hay 1986 . Chiclayo , Peru . 
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In Table 24 , the gross mar gins of dried cassava chips ver sus those of 
maize in the coast and in the Selva can be observed. Cassava competes 
with both of them, constituting a viable a lternative t o farmers. 
At 75% of t he price of mai ze at 13.30 per kilo , dried cassava 
enters in the leas t-cos t r ation. It is a cos t-reducing al ternative , 
even when cassava chips cos t 13. 20/kilo or 95% of the price of maize . 
This i s so , because protein in the form of f i sh flour i s cheap and 
abundant in Peru (Table 25) . 
Projected demand for cassava 
Current trends in food production in Peru point toward an 
i ncr easing dependence on foo d import s , decr easing per capita production , 
narrowing of the alternatives available to consumers , high levels of 
marke t powe r concentration in the food-processing indus tries , and a 
continuing deterioration of the participation of agriculture in GDP. 
This scenario is not onl y undesir able as a goa l but it is probably 
unrealis tic for a country wit h s trong constraint s in its availability of 
fore ign exchange . 
Basi c assumptions. Using a model fo r t he demand of cassava and of 
poultry meat, estimated from time series data , we can pr oject cassava 
consumption needs (in both fre sh and dried forms) into t he f u tur e . From 
the basic model: 
Per capi t a consumption = function (Prices , Income, Ur banization) 
one can assume changes in the independent variables, and calculate the 
new levels implicit in the dependent variable . 
For t he case of f r esh cassava demand, three prices were assumed to 
exhibi t price decreases in real terms , that affec t this variable. They 
are the retail prices of cassava , rice , and whea t pr oducts . Also , while 
t o t al population grows a t 2 . 5% per year, urban population (a " proxy" for 
urbanization) grows a t an annua l 3 . 0% . Per capita r eal income remains 
cons tant, that is , real ｩｮ｣ｯｭｾ＠ gr ows a t 2 . 5% per year. 
Hith r espect t o the demand for poultry , assumptions for population and 
income growth a r e the same as above and the r eal retail price of poultry 
decreases at an a nnual 1 . 0% while t hose of beef and pork remain constant 
(Table 19) . The derived demand fo r cassava is based on t he assumptions 
tha t feed use by the poul try indus try wil l keep its present r atio of 
broiler s and layers , and tha t feed for poultry will represent a constant 
80% of t o tal feed use in the country . Coarse gr ains (yellow maize and 
sor ghum) r epresent 45% of f eed formulas (Tab le 25) . I nternal produc tion 
of yel l ow ma i ze will gr ow a t an annua l 2 . 0% (compar ed with 0 . 4% over the 
1966- 83 period) . 
Fresh cassava . Prospects for car bohydrate output des tined for 
human consumption a r e alarming . The strong performer of the past 15 
years, rice, r eached a peak in 1984 with over one million t ons of 
production , decreased in 1985 and again in 1986 when about 350 , 000 t ons 
of this cer eal \vere import ed . Potat oes, a major s t aple , exhibits 
important reductions in per capi t a cons umption, from about 130 kilos in 
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.ble 24 . Separation of direct cost of production fo r maize (coastal and Se l va) 
and for dried cassava chips (Selva), 1986 . Peru . 
•st in 1ntis 
:r op Technology Land Labor Capital Transport To tal Price 
tize Coast 150 . 00 590 . 88 1786 . 58 2377 . 46 3300 
Selva 30.00 1083 . 28 727 . 21 1810. 49 3300 
·esh cassava Selva 11. 43 492 . 23 306 .88 0 . 00 799 . 11 
·ied Cassava Sel va 0 . 20 110. 24 26 . 90 150 . 00 137 .34 
•tal dried cassava 936 . 45 2000 
at 75% price of maize 24 75 
md rent in coast: 10 . 1200 / ha per year or 10 . 600/ha per semes t er 
md r ent in Selva: 10 .1 20/ha Eer ｾ･｡ｲ＠
tst in US$(113 . 9 = US$ 1) 
Margin 
922 . 54 
1489 . 51 
1063 . 55 
1675 . 89 
:r op Technology Land Labor Capital Transport To t al Price Mar gin 
ti ze Coast 10 . 79 42 . 51 128 . 53 181.83 237 . 41 55 . 58 
Selva 2 .1 6 77 . 93 52 . 32 132 . 41 237 . 41 105 . 00 
:esh cassava Selva 0.82 35. 41 22 . 08 0 . 00 58.31 
:ied cassava Sel va 0. 01 7.93 l. 93 10 . 79 20 . 67 
>tal dried cassava 0.84 43 . 34 24 . 01 10 . 79 78 . 98 143 . 88 64 . 90 
a t 75% price of maize 178 . 06 99 .07 
ｾｴ｡ｩｬ＠ of cos t s tructure for dried cassava chips in the Peruvian Selva (H . Halarin , 1986) 
Farmer, 1 chipper 
9 months 
:oductive un i t 
>nths of operation 
1w material 345.6 tons of fresh cassava 
)St of r aw material 
nount cassava chips for 
ｾｯｮｶ･ｲｳｩｯｮ＠ from f resL to dried 
0.52 Intis/kg, 25% above production cost 
138 . 24 tons a t 15% humidity 
1erall costs (in Intis) 
·lanufacturing cos t s 
Raw material (fresh cassava) 
Labor (2 wor kers for 216 days at 135.3 per day 
Depreciation ( 10% of 5000) 
iminis trative and f inancia l cos t s 
Transport t o feed plant (10 .1 50/ t on) 
1nterest and principal on equipment 
:>tal cost 
Uni t cost per t on of chips 
Unit price with 25% overhead margin 
Current support price 1/ton (June 1986) 
:>URCE: Halarin , H. 1986 . Thesis . 
179 , 712 
15,240 
500 
20 , 736 
3 , 718 
219 , 906 
1,591 
1, 988 
2 , 000 
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Table 25. Least cost formulations (percent of ingredient in total 
rations) , including use of dried cassava chips , Peru . 
Price of maize (Intis/ton) 3300 3300 3300 
Price of cassava chips (Intis/t on) 2600 3000 3200 
Naize 6.82% 17.89% 45 . 82% 
Cassava chips 45 . 92% 32 . 18% o 
Cotton cake 10 . 00% 10.00% 10 . 00% 
Fish meal 15 .00% 15 . ｏｏ￭ ｾ＠ 12 . 78% 
Calcium carbonate 0 . 65% 0 . 69% l. 01% 
Vege t ab le oils 1.50% 1 . 50% 1. 50% 
Feather me al 19 .65% 22 . 34% 28 . 49% 
Lysine 0 .05% 
Me t hionine 0 . 02% 
SOURCE: Compiled by author from prices lis ted by H. Malarin, and physical 
requirements listed by NRC , Feedstuffs Ingr edient Analysis Table : 
1981 edition . (Prepared by Richard D. Allen) . 
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the early seventies to near 70 kilos in the mid-eighties. \fheat, 
another staple in the diets of urban consumers is mostly imported, with 
domestic production representing less than 10% of total use and 
declining in absolute numbers. 
Should current policies and marketing and production practices 
continue, these trends will prevail. But we can be optimistic about the 
adoption of the new cassava storage technology, based on survey data 
collected in Lima, and in Colombia and also in the pilot projects 
conducted in those two countries. 
The immediate future for adoption of the new technologies lies in the 
Selva , where cassava is already an important staple. The new technology 
of storing cassava in plastic bags and treating it with mertect can be 
implemented in this area where 75% of the cassava is produced. The 
target population initially will be the 3.5 million people living in 
Loreto, Ucayali, San Martín, Cajamarca, Amazonas, Huanuco, Paseo, Junin, 
Cuzco, and Madre de Dios. A second stage of adoption could take place 
in the north coast for local consumption. The final stage would be the 
extension, from the coast, of adopting the method for coastal cities 
such as Lima. 
The effects of adopting the new technology would be to increase 
market competítion by reducing natural and artificial barriers of entry 
already present in the current market structure. The barriers result 
from the high perishability of cassava. Their removal would reduce 
marketing margins because of important reductions in waste (from about 
35% to 15%), and therefore would carry the consequent savings to 
consumers (who would pay a lower price) and to farmers (who would 
receive a higher price), and to increase volumes being traded (Janssen 
and Wheatley). 
The above-mentioned assumptions about prices, income, and population 
lead to an estimated per capita consumption of cassava of 14.3 kilos by 
the year 2000 (compared with 18.2 kilos in 1984). This is dueto the 
substitution effect caused by wheat and rice but mainly due to the 
negative effect of urbanization on consumption--an effect that should 
lessen but not disappear with the implementation of the new storage 
technology. This is so because of the difficulty in reaching coastal 
populations (the majority of Peruvians live in the coast) from the Selva 
with a bulky commodity. Even so, there will be a need to expand 
production by 19,700 tons in that year to meet demand due to population 
growth. This figure would be larger if we do not incorporate a 
reduction in waste of 10% as being additional supply. 
Savings associated with this level of waste reduction amount to about 
US$15 million annually by the year 2000 . Although this increase is not 
impressive one has to bear in mind that it represents a reversal of the 
strong trend in reduction of cassava production over the past two decades. 
Dried Cassava. The current interest of the government in providing a 
viable alternative to yellow maize in the manufacture of feed formulas 
is notorious. A decree in mid-1986, providing a support price for dried 
44 
cassava chips and dictating the norms fo r quality, is certainly an 
encouraging sign . We have shown that dried cassava in Peru is: 
Profitable at farro level under the present price and cost 
structure of the country for fresh cassava as well as for yellow 
maize. To compete with maize, the support price for cassava chips 
has to be pegged to t hat fo r maize (plans are to set it at 75% of 
the price of maize). 
Profit able at the feed plant level. Dried cassava enters in the 
least-cos t formulations a t around 95% of the price of yellow maize 
(it s main substitute). 
Attractive to the end user , since quality remains virtually 
unchanged. 
The farro price of fresh cassava , currently well above the support 
price of chips , fluctuates widely, depending on availability and 
transportation. In periods of high rainfall, in certain areas of the 
Selva when roads cannot be used, the producer price of f resh cassava 
drops substantially while at the other end of the chain consumers must 
pay high prices. 
Production of cassava chips will create a floor price fo r the fresh 
root, stabilizing quantities produced as well as prices. 
Identification of s uitable areas for drying compat ible with 
precipitation regime and land-use priorities remains to be done . However , 
semicommercial t rials have been successful and no problems are expected 
in this respect (Halarin) . 
To estímate feed needs, por k and poultry mea t production a re 
projected to the year 2000 , using time series data . Per capita pork 
consumption remains unchanged while for poultry the assumptions imply an 
increase in per capita consumption from 9 . 2 kilos in 1984 t o 12 . 6 kilos 
in the. year 2000 . 
In terms of feed requirements , total needs will go from 633,700 tons 
in 1984 to 1,289 , 600 tons in 2000, mostly due to poultry feed increases . 
With 10% of dried cassava in feed formulations, 128 , 960 tons of it are 
needed. The establishment of the industry allows a further dec r ease in 
waste of cassava for the fresh market of 10%. 
By the year 2000, fresh cassava for the feed industry will amount to 
280,559 tons per year which implies 26 , 720 ha of new plantings, keeping 
yields at t he present level of 10.5 tons/ha . Crop losses will be 
reduced by 41,829 tons annual l y by that year. 
In summary, if both markets (fresh and dried), are added up, annual 
requirements of cassava by the year 2000 will be 657 , 020 tons, which 
implies an additional production of about 301,020 tons per year in 
28 , 592 ha and 7 , 378 new jobs will be generated . 
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Conclus i ons 
Peru was radically trans f or med during the seventies from a social sys tem 
characterized by liberal principles and policies t o one wi t h a very 
t ightly controlled and distorted economy . Agriculture was hard- hit in the 
process. The once high-yielding crops by Latin American standar ds are 
now mere average performers (sugar, cotton, rice). The sector r educed 
its contribution to GDP by half in the past two decades and now 
represent s 12% of the product . 
Policy-induced distortions and state interventions elimina t ed not only 
foreign competition but domestic competitive forces as well . While the 
world economy was booming in the sixties and seventies , Per u lost a 
clear opportunity to continue t he growth impetus of the fifties . 
Valdes and Alvarez conclude tha t ''the prevalence of implicit and 
explicit food subsidies on importables , particularly during t he period 
1970-75, could have induced a change in cons umption patterns away from 
traditional foods produced in Peru, such as pota t oes , and tm.;rards heavier 
dependence on i mported foodstuffs, such as macar oni and bread . Policies 
aimed a t protecting t he urban consumer but ignoring t he consequences of an 
increased fiscal burden would have resulted in t he i mplicit taxation of 
s evera! agricultura! products" (p . 49). 
Cassava is a majar s t a ple in the Selva , where it competes favor ably 
with other crops, even under the present policy environment. For dry 
cassava chips, its potential demand will be materialized into effective use 
if t he support price a lready established by the gover nment is se t as a 
fixed proportion of the price of yellow ma i ze and i f ENCI buys t he 
chips , following the same guidelines app lied to t he commercialization of 
local yellow mai ze. In such a case, it has a bright future as an animal 
feed i nput in Peru. 
The case of f r esh cassava r equires the implementation of the new 
conservation technology developed at the Centro Internacional de 
Agricultura Tropical (CIAT) , Colombia. The me thod is being tested now 
in Satipo- La Mer ced . The method shoul d be i ntroduced first in the 
Selva, where a s trong na tural marke t already exists. Once the markets 
have assimilated the new t echnology and producers have responded by 
becoming more efficient in t hei r production and mar keting t echniques , 
fresh cassava stored i n plastic bags and trea ted with mertect will be 
ready to reach coastal consumers . 
Under the existing set of policies t ha t block the r egulatory 
effect s resulting from the pr esence of competitive forces , it i s 
unlikely t hat an improvement in resource allocation and adoption of new 
technologies in neglected crops wi l l t ake place , unless the crop is 
s ubject to similar trea t ment as the one presently received by grains and 
cereals. In addition to t hat , developments in i nfrastruc ture , for 
example, in r oads such as the Carretera Marginal de l a Selva and the 
road linking the northern Sel va with t he northern coast , are urgently 
needed i f t here is t o be a more balanced regional and sector al gr owth in 
the near fu ture . 
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